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EXACTIONS CREEP
Lee Anne Fennell* and Eduardo M. Peñalver†
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a Supreme Court justice who cares deeply about
property rights. You worry that landowners are too easily exploited by
governmental entities, and you believe that the Constitution must protect
their prerogatives as owners. You recognize, however, that a panoply of
zoning restrictions, building codes, and other laws and ordinances often
preserve and enhance the value and stability of landownership. The idea that
property must be both protected from state power and with state power
resonates with you, but it presents a doctrinal challenge. How can the
Constitution protect landowners from the government without disabling the
machinery that protects ownership itself? The Supreme Court’s exactions
jurisprudence can be understood as an attempt to confront this challenge.1
The Court has sought to subject some local land use actions to heightened
scrutiny as a matter of federal constitutional law2 while leaving the
superstructure of zoning, permitting, and taxation in place.3 The difficulties
with this approach became apparent in Koontz v St. Johns River Water
Management District.4 That the Supreme Court has failed in this difficult
balancing act is no surprise. How it has failed, and why it may continue to
fail, is the interesting topic of this essay.
The Court’s exactions jurisprudence, set forth in Nollan v California
Coastal Commission,5 Dolan v City of Tigard,6 and now Koontz, requires
*
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filed in Dolan v City of Tigard on behalf of the National Association of Counties et al. My academic work on the
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1
We do not mean to suggest that all or even any of the justices would frame the enterprise in quite this way,
only that the pattern of decided cases reflects a struggle prompted by these competing goals.
2
The Court has grounded this selectively intensified scrutiny in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—a
foundation that is notoriously unstable. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
3
Even if most of the garden-variety land use regulations and taxes falling into this latter category could
ultimately survive heightened scrutiny, the exercise of applying such scrutiny would be undesirably costly for
both courts and local governments.
4
133 S Ct 2586, 570 US __ (2013).
5
483 US 825 (1987).
6
512 US 374 (1994).
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the government to satisfy demanding criteria for certain bargains—or
proposed bargains—implicating the use of land. But the Court has left the
domain of this heightened scrutiny wholly undefined. Indeed, the Koontz
majority eschewed any boundary principle that would hive off its exactions
jurisprudence from its land use jurisprudence more generally. By beating
back one form of exactions creep—the possibility that local governments
will circumvent a too-narrowly drawn circle of heightened scrutiny—the
Court left land use regulation vulnerable to the creeping expansion of
heightened scrutiny under the auspices of its exactions jurisprudence.
At first blush, the fact that exactions always involve actual or proposed
land use “bargains” might seem to mark out a clear and well-defined arena
for heightened scrutiny. But in fact, virtually every restriction, fee, or tax
associated with the ownership or use of land can be cast as a bargain. 7 To
retain its commitment to heightened scrutiny for a subset (and only a
subset) of land use controls, the Court must construct some stopping point.
Ideally, a boundary principle would be relatively easily to apply and would
track relevant normative considerations relatively well. In the exactions
context, however, markers that can even minimally approximate these
criteria are in short supply—and the Court discarded some of the most
promising ones in Koontz.
The difficulty the Court has experienced and will continue to experience
in constructing a logically coherent, administrable, and normatively
appealing way to bound heightened scrutiny should, we suggest, lead it to
rethink its exactions jurisprudence, and especially its grounding in the
Takings Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause. Choosing an approach
going forward requires examining not only the impact on land use bargains
but also the collateral damage that the rule in question may do to takings
law and other constitutional doctrines, including the broader doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
This essay proceeds in five parts. Part I lays out the doctrinal terrain and
shows where the Koontz case fits in. Part II demonstrates the potential
boundlessness of the domain to which heightened scrutiny applies under the
Court’s recently revamped exactions jurisprudence. To maintain land use
law as we know it, limits must be somehow derived or constructed. Part III
approaches this question by asking what normative principles might
underlie the sort of skepticism about bargaining reflected in exactions
jurisprudence. After considering several possibilities, we suggest that the
most plausible answer is found in rule-of-law concerns implicated by land
use deal making. Part IV tries to divine the limits that the Koontz majority
7

The point is not limited to land use law. Virtually all governmental restrictions and impositions, head taxes
aside, can be cast in conditional terms, as they are premised upon choosing to sell, earn, employ, and so on. See
Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 11 (Princeton 1993).
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might have had in mind, given the way that its holdings intersect with prior
doctrine. This sets the stage for Part V, which considers a series of
alternatives that would attempt to reconcile the Court’s twin interests in
reining in governmental power over property owners and in keeping the
gears of ordinary land use regulation running in ways that protect the
property interests of those owners.
I. TAKINGS, DUE PROCESS, AND EXACTIONS
Koontz arose out of a conflict between Coy Koontz, a Florida
landowner, and the St. Johns River Water Management District (“District”),
a regional water authority. Koontz had purchased a 14.9-acre tract of land
near Orlando in 1972. The land was mostly wetlands, though it also
contained some forested uplands. Florida law required Koontz to obtain
permission from the District before filling any wetlands. In 1994, Koontz
applied for a permit from the District to develop the northern 3.7 acres of
his parcel, virtually all of which were wetlands.8 He offered to dedicate a
conservation easement covering the remaining 11 acres. In the past, the
District had required owners seeking permission to fill wetlands to preserve
10 acres of wetland for every acre they filled.9 In keeping with this general
practice, the District proposed that Koontz either reduce the size of his
development to a single acre (dedicating a conservation easement for the
remainder of the property) or, alternatively, that he develop the 3.7 acres as
he proposed, but pay to improve the drainage on additional, District-owned
land.10 The District also indicated that it was willing to entertain alternative
proposals from Koontz.11
Koontz rejected the District’s proposal and refused to offer any
alternatives. The District denied the permit. Rather than go back to the
bargaining table, Koontz filed a lawsuit in state court. He claimed that the
conditions for permit approval contained in the District’s proposal violated
the Takings Clause.12 Among other things, Koontz challenged the District’s
suggested swap of development approval for wetlands protection or
mitigation as an unlawful “exaction.” This exactions claim is different from
a claim that the permit denial itself took Koontz’s property. Instead of
challenging the regulatory burden that a denial would impose, Koontz’s
8

St. Johns River Water Management District v Koontz, 77 S3d 1220, 1224 (Fla 2011).
See John Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever? *3 (Vermont Law School Research
Paper No. 28-13, Aug 2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316406 (visited Nov 18, 2013) (citing Brief for
Respondent, Koontz v St. Johns Water Management District, No 11-1447, *12 (filed Dec 21, 2012) (available on
Westlaw at 2012 WL 6694053)).
10
133 S Ct at 2593.
11
Id.
12
Koontz sued under Fla Stat § 373.617(2), which provide a cause of action for damages if a state action is
“an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.”
9
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exaction theory contested the legality of the bargain the District was trying
to strike. In order to understand how the mere attempt to bargain with a
property owner—without any property changing hands—might violate the
Takings Clause, we must briefly explore the contours of the Supreme
Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.
A. Takings and Due Process
In considering whether a regulation of land constitutes a taking of
property requiring just compensation, the Supreme Court usually adheres to
the analysis laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City.13
The Penn Central factors include the “economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant,” “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations” and the “character of the
governmental action.”14
The focus of this default regulatory takings
inquiry, as the Court made clear in Lingle v Chevron USA, Inc.,15 is the
severity of the burden the regulation imposes on the property owner.16 The
unanimous Court in Lingle contrasted this burden-focused inquiry with a
means-ends style inquiry into the rationality of government regulation. The
latter, the Court said, falls within the province of the Due Process Clause
and, in undertaking it, courts should be highly deferential to the elected
branches.17
The Court has carved out from its default Penn Central takings analysis
two per se rules governing discrete categories of regulation. First, in
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, the Court held that a
permanent physical invasion of property authorized by the government
necessarily constitutes a taking.18 In subsequent cases, the Court has
characterized the state appropriation of discrete pools of money, such as the
interest from a specific account, as Loretto-type takings.19
The Court created a second per se regulatory takings rule in Lucas v
South Carolina Coastal Council.20 In that case, the Court held that a
13

438 US 104 (1978).
Id at 124.
544 US 528 (2005).
16
As the Lingle Court explains, “severity of the burden” represents a common thread running through all of
its regulatory takings jurisprudence, one that can be used to test how closely a given governmental act
approximates a physical appropriation, and to assess the distributive fairness of the imposition. Id at 538-39; see
id. at 539–40, 542–43.
17
Id at 543–45. The inquiries serve different purposes as well. A violation of the Due Process clause leads
to the invalidation of the enactment, whereas a Takings Clause violation represents an otherwise legitimate
governmental act that can be fully validated by the payment of just compensation. Id at 542.
18
458 US 419, 441 (1982).
19
See, for example, Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 US 216, 235 (2003). Cases finding the
appropriation of interest from specific accounts to be takings predate Loretto. See, for example, Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc v Beckwith, 449 US 155, 159, 164 (1980) (and cases cited therein).
20
505 US 1003 (1992).
14
15
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regulation is per se a taking (and not subject to the Penn Central analysis)
when it permanently deprives an owner of all economically viable use of
her property—unless the rule does no more than codify limitations on
owners’ rights already built into “background principles” of state property
law, such as nuisance.21 The Loretto and Lucas exceptions to Penn Central
are consistent with the Court’s characterization of the takings inquiry in
Lingle: Their focus is on the burden government action imposes on owners.
The Court’s takings framework is not a model of clarity or coherence. It
can be (and has been) assailed on normative, logical, and administrability
grounds. We will not delve into those criticisms here, but will instead
accept these principles as given for purposes of addressing one particularly
problematic corner of the doctrinal picture: exactions.
B. Enter Exactions
Sitting more uncomfortably with Lingle’s takings/due-process typology
is the Court’s treatment of claims that the government has conditioned
development approval on exactions of constitutionally protected property
rights from the landowner. In Nollan v California Coastal Commission,22
the plaintiffs owned a small beachfront home in California. They wanted to
demolish the existing home and build a new, larger home on their lot.
California law required them to obtain permission from the Coastal
Commission before they could undertake their project. The Commission
refused to grant the Nollans permission to build unless they would give the
state a lateral easement allowing the public to cross over the portion of their
property adjacent to the mean high tide line.23 The Supreme Court
concluded that the exaction was unconstitutional.24 It held that the
demanded easement did not share an “essential nexus” with the goal the
Commission would have (legitimately) advanced by simply denying the
requested permission to expand the house.
In Dolan v City of Tigard,25 the Court added to Nollan’s “essential
nexus” inquiry the requirement that the burden of the condition imposed
upon development permission be roughly proportional to the harm that
would be caused by permitting the development to go forward.26 The
plaintiff in Dolan owned a small hardware store. When she applied for a
permit to expand the store and pave her parking lot, the city conditioned
approval of her application on her dedication of a piece of her property to
21

Id at 1029–31.
483 US 825 (1987).
23
Id at 827–29.
24
See id at 841–42.
25
512 US 374 (1994).
26
Id. at 391.
22
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the city for use as a flood plain (subject to a recreational easement) and
bicycle path.27 The Court conceded the existence of a nexus between the
city’s demands and the impacts of the plaintiff’s expanded use of her
property on traffic and stormwater runoff. But it nonetheless held that the
city had violated the Takings Clause because it had failed to establish that
its exaction was proportional to the impacts the plaintiff’s proposed
expansion would cause.28
The “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests established in
Nollan and Dolan together produced an inquiry, ostensibly operating under
the Takings Clause, that involves an intermediate level of means-ends
scrutiny. The inquiry is noteworthy in two respects. First, it scrutinizes the
fit between means (the condition imposed by the government) and ends
(mitigation of the harm caused by the proposed development). Importantly,
it does not evaluate the burden imposed on the landowner by the underlying
regulatory regime from which she is seeking relief. This would appear to
place the test in the domain that the Court identified in Lingle with the Due
Process Clause, not the Takings Clause.29 Second, the exactions inquiry
involves a level of scrutiny of the proffered ends and chosen means that
would be highly unusual in the due process context.30 The court in Dolan
specifically opted for the “rough proportionality” language in order to make
clear that the inquiry was to be more searching than the usual “rational
basis” review.31 Moreover, it placed the burden of establishing compliance
with the exactions test squarely on the government’s shoulders, thereby
inverting the traditional presumption of constitutionality of properly enacted
regulations.32
The Court has characterized its exactions jurisprudence as an
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.33 That doctrine
limits the ability of the government to condition its grant of a discretionary
benefit to a claimant on the claimant’s waiver of some constitutional right
that the government would not be entitled simply to override. 34 For
27

See id at 379–81, 393–94.
See id at 388, 394–95. The Court left ambiguous whether it is the harm eliminated by the exaction that
must be proportional to the harm the development causes or whether it is the cost of the exaction (to the
landowner) that must be proportional to those harms.
29
See Lingle, 544 US at 542–43.
30
Governmental acts directed at social and economic goals receive rational basis review unless they
implicate fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications. Such review requires only that the act be rationally
related to a conceivable governmental purpose (not necessarily the one that actually animated the governmental
body). While it is possible that a governmental act that “fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may
be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause,” Lingle, 544 US at 542, the test is a
deferential one that does not put the government to its proof in establishing how well, or even if, the legislation
serves particular goals.
31
512 US at 391.
32
See id at 394–96; id at 405–11 (Stevens dissenting); id at 413–14 (Souter dissenting).
33
Dolan, 512 US at 385; Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594–95; Lingle, 544 US at 547.
34
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has spawned considerable scholarly output. Influential treatments
include, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State (1993); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint
28
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example, the government cannot condition its grant of employment—
something it is entitled under normal circumstances to withhold—on an
applicant’s waiver of his First Amendment right to choose his own religion.
In the exactions context, the constitutional right at issue has been located in
the Takings Clause. As the court put it in Koontz, by conditioning
development approval on the landowner’s conveyance of some property
interest to the government, “the government can pressure an owner into
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would
otherwise require just compensation.”35
C. The Scope of Scrutiny
Nollan and Dolan sparked two axes of disagreement among the lower
courts about the reach of the exactions doctrine.36 First, courts split over
whether Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny applied to exactions in which the
government demands a cash payment rather than a dedication of an interest
in land in exchange for development permission.37 Second, they divided
over whether the exactions doctrine applies only to so-called “ad hoc” or
“adjudicated,” exactions, that is, exactions whose terms are worked out on a
case-by-case basis in negotiations with landowners. Courts and
commentators usually contrast adjudicative exactions with exactions that
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum L Rev 473 (1991);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413 (1989); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293 (1984).. Despite the Dolan
Court’s characterization of the doctrine as “well-settled,” 512 US at 385, it has so thoroughly eluded attempts to
reduce it to a workable formula that some scholars have urged abandonment of it altogether. See generally
Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72
Denv U L Rev 989 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism
with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion, 70 BU L Rev 593 (1990). Theoretical work on the
doctrine continues, nonetheless. Notable recent works include, for example, Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional
Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 Va L Rev 479 (2012); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without
Baselines, 90 Geo L J 1 (2001).
35
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594.
36
Another unresolved issue, addressed in Koontz, was the status of “failed exactions” —exactions proposed
to a landowner but not accepted or implemented. See generally Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 Vt L Rev 623
(2012); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J Land Use & Envir L 277 (2011).
37
See Ann E. Carlson and Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Takings
Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 UC Davis L Rev 103, 137–38 (2001) (suggesting that Nollan
and Dolan may encourage use of impact fees and discourage physical land exactions); David A. Dana, Land Use
Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 NC L Rev 1243, 1259–60 (1997) (considering the varying
interpretations of Dolan’s application to monetary exactions); see also Dudek v Umatilla County, 69 P3d 751,
757–58 (Or Ct App 2003) (discussing the split among courts over the question of whether Dolan applies to
monetary exactions). Cases holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to monetary exactions include McClung v
City of Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir 2008); Smith v Town of Mendon, 4 NY3d 1, 12 (2004); Home
Builders Association v City of Scottsdale, 930 P2d 993, 999–1000 (Ariz 1997); West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C.
v City of West Linn, 240 P3d 29, 45–46 (Or 2010); City of Olympia v Drebick, 126 P3d 802, 808 (Wash 2006).
Cases holding that monetary exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny include, Town of Flower Mound v
Stafford Estates Ltd Partnership, 135 SW3d 620, 635–40 (Tex 2004); Home Builders Association of Dayton and
the Miami Valley v City of Beavercreek, 89 Ohio St 3d 121, 128 (2000); Ehrlich v City of Culver City, 911 P2d
429, 433 (Cal 1996); Northern Illinois Home Builders Association v County of DuPage, 165 Ill 2d 25, 32–35
(1995).
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are more “legislative” in character.38 A legislative exaction is one in which
the state’s conditions on development are spelled out in advance in a
generally applicable formula or schedule.
Before Koontz, the Supreme Court had not intervened to decisively
resolve either debate. On at least two occasions, however, it had used dicta
to describe its exactions cases as having involved ad hoc state demands that
owners turn over tangible interests in land. In City of Monterey v Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd,39 the Court defined “exactions” as “land-use
decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of
property to public use.”40 Later, in Lingle, the Court suggested that the
reach of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny was limited to “adjudicative land use
exactions,” in which the state demands—in exchange for development
permission—that the property owner hand over an interest in land that, if
imposed directly, “would have been a per se physical taking.”41 This dicta
in Lingle appeared to put the Court in the camp of the lower courts that had
declined to apply Nollan and Dolan to so-called “legislative” exactions
(exactions that operate according to a predetermined formula or schedule)
and on the side of those lower courts that had declined to apply Nollan and
Dolan to exactions of money.42
D. The Koontz Decision
In Koontz, the Supreme Court definitively rejected the notion – hinted at
in Del Monte Dunes and Lingle—that the Nollan/Dolan test applies only to
exactions of physical interests in land. Koontz had prevailed in the state trial
court and intermediate appellate court on an exactions theory, but the
Florida Supreme Court had reversed, finding Nollan and Dolan inapplicable
based on its interpretation of the scope of the Supreme Court’s exactions
doctrine. Relying on the limiting language in Del Monte Dunes and Lingle,
the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to
exactions of money and, in addition, do not apply when an agency denies
the requested permit (as opposed to granting the permit subject to certain
38
Cases holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to “legislative” exactions include McClung v City of
Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1227–28 (9th Cir 2008); St. Clair County Home Builders Association v City of Pell City,
61 S3d 992, 1007 (Ala 2010); Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Association v DeKalb County, 588 SE2d 694, 697
(Ga 2003); San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 671–72 (2002); Krupp v
Breckenridge Sanitation District, 19 P3d 687, 695–96 (Colo 2001); Curtis v Town of South Tomaston, 708 A2d
657, 659–60 (Me 1998); Parking Association of Ga., Inc v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200, 203 n 3 (Ga 1994). In
Town of Flower Mound, 135 SW3d at 640–42, in contrast, the Texas Supreme Court applied Nollan and Dolan to
a legislative exaction.
39
526 US 687 (1999).
40
Id at 702.
41
544 US at 546.
42
See McClung, 548 F3d at 1226–28 (relying on Lingle to limit Nollan and Dolan analysis to adjudicated
land use exactions); Wisconsin Builders’ Association v Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 702 NW2d 433,
446–48 (Wis App 2005) (same).
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conditions).43
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected both of these limits on Nollan and
Dolan. All of the Justices agreed that, contrary to the Florida Supreme
Court’s holding, permit denials as well as conditional permit grants are
subject to exactions scrutiny. In the majority’s words,
[a] contrary rule would be especially untenable . . .
because it would enable the government to evade the
limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its
demands for property as conditions precedent to permit
approval. Under the Florida Supreme Court’s approach, a
government order stating that a permit is “approved if” the
owner turns over that property would be subject to Nollan
and Dolan, but an identical order that uses the words “denied
until” would not.44
The justices split over the question whether a demand for money fell
within the boundaries of Nollan and Dolan. The five-justice majority
opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that the Court’s exactions
jurisprudence reached demands for money. The dissenters, led by Justice
Elena Kagan, rejected this position.
In reaching its conclusion, the Koontz majority had to navigate around
the Court’s 1998 decision in Eastern Enterprises v Apfel.45 In Eastern
Enterprises, a plurality of the Court had concluded that retroactively
imposing liability on coal operators for retired coal miners’ medical benefits
violated the Takings Clause.46 However, the four dissenters in Eastern
Enterprises, along with Justice Anthony Kennedy (who concurred in the
judgment on due process grounds), took the position that the Takings
Clause did not apply at all when government imposes general obligations to
pay money.47 As Justice Kennedy put it, “the Government's imposition of
an obligation . . . must relate to a specific property interest to implicate the
Takings Clause.”48 Kennedy thereby distinguished cases like Brown v
Legal Foundation of Washington,49 in which the government had seized
interest earned on specific accounts.
The concern with applying the Takings Clause to more generalized
43

See St. Johns River Management District v Koontz, 77 S3d 1220, 1230 (Fla 2011).
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595–96. The dissent agreed. See id at 2603 (Kagan dissenting).
45
524 US 498 (1998).
46
Significantly, the plurality did not conclude that the imposition of retroactive liability constituted a per se
regulatory taking under Loretto or Lucas. Instead, it found a taking only after applying the multifactor Penn
Central analysis. Id at 529–37.
47
Id at 554–58 (Breyer dissenting); id at 543–45 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
48
Id at 544 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
49
538 US 216 (2003).
44
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obligations to pay money was, as Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his
dissenting opinion, the difficulty of distinguishing such obligations from
taxes, which have long been understood to lie beyond takings scrutiny.50
“If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay B,” he
asked, “why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay
the government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?”51
Courts and commentators alike have read Eastern Enterprises to mean
that general obligations to pay money do not fall within the ambit of
“private property” protected by the Takings Clause.52 In Koontz, the
majority did not reject this reading of Eastern Enterprises—unsurprising,
given that Justice Kennedy joined the Koontz majority. Instead, Justice
Alito seized on Justice Kennedy’s specific language in Eastern Enterprises
to argue that, unlike in Eastern Enterprises, “the demand for money at issue
[in Koontz] did ‘operate upon . . . an identified property interest’ by
directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary
payment.”53 As a consequence, the majority argued, “the demand for
money burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land”54 and
takings scrutiny was appropriate.
II. EXACTIONS UNBOUND
Having described the relevant legal terrain, let us return to our
hypothetical Supreme Court justice worried about both protecting private
property rights from government abuse and safeguarding the ability of
government to protect property expectations through tools like zoning law.
Applying heightened means-ends scrutiny to land use regulation across the
board would seem to tip the scales too far in the direction of limiting
government power. Moreover, to subject all decisions on zoning, taxation,
and permits to such scrutiny would upend the established expectations of
the very landowners that our justice means to protect. And so a doctrine
like Nollan/Dolan nexus and proportionality review must be kept within
limits.
At first blush, the Court’s exactions jurisprudence seems to occupy a
50

Id at 556 (Breyer dissenting). Although Richard Epstein has famously argued that takings analysis should
apply to taxes, this approach has not been pursued by the judiciary or political branches. See Richard A. Epstein,
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 95 (Harvard 1985) (casting all regulations, taxes,
and changes in liability rules as “takings of private property prima facie compensable by the state”); id at 283
(“The proposition that all taxes are subject to scrutiny under the eminent domain clause receives not a whisper of
current support.”); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 Colum L Rev 2182, 2185–86 (2004)
(“Whatever influence Epstein's theory has had on discussions of takings law generally, few have accepted his
invitation to turn their backs on the unqualified power to tax.”).
51
524 US at 556 (Breyer dissenting).
52
See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va L Rev 885, 903–
07 (2000); Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2605–07 (Kagan dissenting).
53
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599, quoting Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US 498, 554–56 (1998).
54
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599.
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well-bounded territory: Heightened scrutiny only applies when the
government attempts to bargain with a landowner over the grant of a permit
(or some other land use privilege). But this apparently straightforward
means of firewalling off the domain of Nollan and Dolan depends on a
doubtful proposition: that land use “bargains” (understood broadly as land
use regulations that are somehow conditional in their application to
particular landowners) can be readily picked out from land use controls
more generally. For several reasons, including some exacerbated by Koontz
itself, deal-spotting is not so simple. As a consequence, defining the Court’s
exactions test in terms of bargaining alone risks allowing the test to slip its
bonds and become the basis for wide-ranging heightened judicial scrutiny
of land use regulation generally.
A. The Ubiquity of Deal Making in Land Use Law
Discretionary, conditional, or negotiated applications of land use laws
are not aberrations that stand out against a backdrop of well-ordered,
prospectively announced, and uniformly imposed land use regulations.
Instead, land use control typically proceeds in a piecemeal fashion. 55 Land
use deal making frequently takes the form embodied in the Court’s
exactions cases: regulators have discretion to block or permit a project to
go forward, and they bargain with the landowner over the terms on which
they will approve the project. As a consequence, the exactions test already
potentially covers a large portion of land use regulation. But even in the
absence of such explicit bargaining, most if not all land use law can be
framed as deal making given that the laws are conditional in nature and
subject to frequent and fine-grained revision.56
To see why the fluid and highly individualized nature of land use
regulation makes it difficult to isolate the phenomenon of bargaining,
consider Figure 1’s stylized depiction of an exaction. At its essence, an
exaction pairs some desired land use benefit with some land use burden.
We will defer for the moment the question of which burdens are sufficient
to trigger scrutiny as an exaction, and assume that the burden depicted is of
this nature.

55
See, for example, Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 Cal L Rev 837, 841 (1983) (describing piecemeal changes as “the everyday fare of local land
regulations”).
56
Jurisdictions vary in their approaches to piecemeal changes as well as to the enterprise (and indeed
necessity) of comprehensive land use planning. See text accompanying notes 180, 192–195. Nonetheless, all
jurisdictions incorporate some flexibility into their land use control regimes, and hence afford some degree of
discretion to local decisionmaking bodies.
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Figure 1: The Exaction

An exaction, as envisioned by Nollan and Dolan, offers a bundled
choice to a landowner. Option 1 in Figure 1 represents the status quo land
use package, which includes benefits B and burdens C. In the prototypical
exaction, the state offers the landowner the paired set of benefit A and
burden D, which when added to the existing land use package comprise
Option 2. For a concrete example, consider the facts in Nollan. Nollan
began with a land use package that gave him certain rights (B), including
the right to maintain and use the existing residential structure on his
beachfront property. This package also came with certain burdens (C), such
as complying with zoning and building codes, not creating a nuisance,
paying property taxes, and so on. Nollan wished to tear down the existing
cottage and build a larger home on the property. The right to do this was
not part of his initial land use package. The government offered this benefit
(A) to him, but it coupled it with a new burden (D), which consisted of
granting an easement allowing the public to cross his property. Thus, Nollan
was given a choice between Option 1 and Option 2.
This choice set was identified as an exaction, subjected to heightened
means-ends scrutiny, and deemed constitutionally impermissible due to the
lack of a logical nexus between the grant of A and the imposition of D. The
impacts of building a larger house on private land, the Court reasoned, were
completely unrelated to the government’s stated interest in safeguarding
public beach access.57 In Dolan, the Court deemed a similar choice set—
between forgoing the right to expand a hardware business and granting the
57

Nollan, 483 US at 837–38.
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public land for a bike path and greenway—impermissible due to the lack of
rough proportionality between the impact of expanding the store and the
value of the property interests demanded by the state.58 In both cases, the
Court assumed for the sake of argument that the government had no duty to
supply benefit A at all, but could instead leave the landowners with Option
1, their initial mix of burdens and benefits.59 What the Court held that the
government could not constitutionally do was to condition the grant of
benefit A on the concession of burden D—unless the deal passed the tests of
nexus and rough proportionality.
Suppose, however, there was no other burden of interest to the
government that would meet the Nollan and Dolan tests—or that the
government did not want to bear the high cost of proving that it was in
compliance with those tests. In that case, the government would be put to a
choice between leaving the landowner with Option 1 and providing an
alternative land use regime (Option 3) in which it simply grants benefit A
without any additional burden. This is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The Government’s Choice Set Sans Exaction

Why might the government choose Option 3 over Option 1? It would
do so if it actually expected the additional development allowed by granting
58

See Dolan, 512 US at 392–96.
See Nollan, 438 US at 835–36 (assuming without deciding that preventing blockage of the beach is a
legitimate public purpose, “in which case the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their
permit outright if their new house . . . would substantially impede these purposes, unless the denial would
interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their property as to constitute a taking.”); Dolan, 512 US at 387
(“Undoubtedly, the prevention of flooding along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the
Central Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld”).
59
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the landowner benefit A to be valuable on net for the community (due, say,
to an enriched property tax base, new local employment opportunities, or
otherwise).60 Of course, there are also plenty of reasons a local government
might just stick with Option 1—even if both it and the landowner would
prefer the now unavailable Option 2.61
B. Hidden Bargains
Already, we can see how exactions threatens to swallow a large
proportion of land use control—unless we can identify some characteristic
of the burden in question, or some distinguishing feature of the way in
which the burden and benefit are paired or presented to the landowner, that
pares down the category.62 But the problem of unboundedness goes even
deeper than the discussion to this point might suggest: How can we be sure
that Option 1 is not itself a constitutionally improper bargain? If Option 1
is the starting point for negotiations, it might seem like it cannot possibly
constitute a bargain itself. But Option 1 is never the only choice. This is so
for three reasons: (1) the possibility that past bargains produced the law as
presently incarnated in Option 1; (2) the existence of as-yet-unchosen
options and tradeoffs intentionally built into Option 1 (embedded bargains);
and (3) the pervasive possibility that the existing law can be changed in the
future (hypothetical bargains).
1. Past bargains.
Option 1 is just one of many forms into which the law might have
crafted the mix of benefits and burdens of landownership in a particular
jurisdiction. It is possible, and indeed likely, that the law reached its
present form only after lawmakers engaged in a great deal of bargaining
with affected landowners, bundling burdens with benefits in ways that look
very much like the paradigmatic exaction shown in Figure 1. For example,
Lynne Sagalyn describes how, in the 1980s, New York City consulted with
private developers, civic groups, and non-profit foundations as it attempted
to facilitate the redevelopment of Times Square.63 As Sagalyn put it, “the
60
See Epstein, Bargaining at 183 (referencing the “empirical guess” in the Nollan situation that the
government will choose not to deny the permit outright, since doing so “necessarily deprives the community of
the increased taxes generated by a new residence which probably will not increase the demands on public facilities
by the same amount”) (cited in note 7).
61
A number of scholars have focused on the possibility that restrictions on exactions will block efficient
bargains. See, for example, Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 Cal L Rev 609, 661–65 (2004); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals:
Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 Iowa L Rev 1, 28–33 (2000); William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use
Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 L & Contemp Probs 101, 104–06 (1987).
62
See Parts III and IV.
63
Lynne B. Sagalyn, Times Square Roulette: Remaking the City Icon 91–102 (MIT 2001).
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political problem of rebuilding West 42nd Street involved an extraordinarily
delicate act of balancing the city and state’s aggressive plan for large-scale
ground-up development … with its other goals for preserving the historic
midblock theaters and their symbolic sense of place … while
accommodating the intense community and business concerns of Clinton
and the Garment District….”64 To be sure, these negotiations—and the
kinds of changes in New York’s zoning laws that grew out of them—
happened at some point in the past. But this would not necessarily put them
beyond the reach of constitutional scrutiny. As the Court held in Palazzolo
v Rhode Island,65 the mere fact that a law was enacted in the past does not
prevent a landowner from challenging it as a taking. As Justice Kennedy
put it in his opinion for the Palazzolo Court, some “enactments are
unreasonable and do not become less so through the passage of time or
title.”66 It is not obvious why similar logic would not apply to past bargains
between landowners and the state that violated the requirements of Nollan
and Dolan.
2. Embedded bargains.
In addition, some versions of Option 1 will include what we might call
“embedded bargains”—as yet unrealized bargains between the state and the
landowner built into the very structure of the law. For instance, a “floor
area ratio” (FAR) that is used to regulate building bulk invites landowners
to make a kind of tradeoff. Unlike traditional setbacks and height limits,
floor area ratios control bulk by limiting the total internal square footage of
a structure as compared with the square footage of the parcel as a whole.
For example, if someone owns a 10,000-square-foot lot, assigning that lot a
FAR of 0.5 means that the owner can build a 5,000-square-foot structure on
the lot. How she uses that 5,000 square feet is up to her (within whatever
other limits the state imposes). Thus, she could comply with the FAR by
building a structure with a single floor of 5,000 square feet, with two floors
of 2,500 square feet each, three floors of 1,667 square feet, and so on. In
effect, the law constitutes an offer to the owner to trade the benefit of
greater height for the burden of preserving more open space around the
building, or the benefit of smaller setbacks for the burden of lower height.
Conditional use permits are another example of this kind of built-in
bargain. Conditional uses are presumptively permissible under a zoning
law provided that the landowner complies with the conditions specified in
the zoning law. For example, the zoning code might permit a daycare
64

Id at 101.
533 US 606 (2001).
66
Palazzolo, 533 US at 627 (2001).
65
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business in a residential district provided that the owner (1) keeps off-street
parking to the rear of the building; (2) does not operate after certain hours;
(3) installs a landscaping buffer between her business and neighboring
owners; etc. So-called “incentive zoning,” in which landowners obtain
permission to exceed zoning limits in exchange for providing various public
goods (such as low-income housing or public space) similarly embed
bargains, but allow a broader divergence between the impacts of the
landowner’s development and the specified conditions.67
In these examples, the state’s position on the terms of any bargain is
spelled out in advance and available to all on the same basis. Thus, the law
embeds a take-it-or-leave-it offer, not an invitation to haggle.68 For
instance, depending on the level of specificity of the conditions, obtaining a
permit to engage in a conditional use can be a fairly ministerial act without
any interaction with the state that we might characterize as bargaining.
However, land use ordinances can also embed conditional elements that
leave significant discretion to local governmental actors, whether explicitly
or through the use of open-textured terms subject to official interpretation.69
3. Hypothetical bargains.
Finally, as we have already observed, the highly individualized revision
of land use law is a pervasive phenomenon. For any given pattern of land
use benefits and burdens (Option 1), there is almost always some other
package (call it Option X) that would be acceptable to the government.
This alternative package, let us suppose, would vary from the existing law
that applies to an owner’s parcel by increments corresponding to Benefit Y
and Burden Z, as shown in Figure 3.

67
For an example of incentive zoning, see Barry D. Yatt, Cracking the Codes: An Architect’s Guide to
Building Regulations 154 (John Wiley 1998) (describing incentive zoning in Seattle).
68
See Epstein, Bargaining at 11 (observing that a wide variety of government regulations and taxes might be
characterized “as take-it-or-leave-it offers that are extended by the government to all individuals”) (cited in note
7).
69
See text accompanying note 176.
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Figure 3: Option X

If Benefit Y and Burden Z are actually paired together by the
government and offered to the landowner, the situation is that of the
prototypical exaction. But what if Benefit Y and Burden Z are simply “in
the air” so to speak? The government may know very well that the
landowner wants Benefit Y, or something like Benefit Y. Perhaps the
landowner has asked for it, or it is the sort of benefit that anyone in the
landowner’s position would want. The landowner may also be aware that
the government would like to impose Burden Z, or something like Burden
Z. Perhaps the landowner looks around and sees other landowners who
currently have Option X and prefers their situation over her own, and voices
a preference for this alternative.
How much must be said about Option X, and by whom, and in what
way, in order for the situation to amount to “bargaining” (and therefore
potentially an impermissible exaction)? Here it becomes important that,
because of Koontz, an exaction need not take the form of an explicit
condition placed on permit approval in order to receive heightened scrutiny
and be found unconstitutional. Instead, a demand made prior to a permit
denial should, according to the Court, receive the exact same treatment.70
But when do ambient discussions about an Option X (of which there may be
innumerable versions) coalesce into a “failed exaction” that receives
Nollan/Dolan review?

70

See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595–96.
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III. LOOKING FOR NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
The discussion above established only that the domain of exactions is
not self-limiting as a conceptual or practical matter—not that it cannot be
somehow limited. The difficulty lies in finding a coherent way to identify
what is in and what is out of the realm of elevated scrutiny, given the
conflicting goals of protecting landowners from the government and
protecting them from each other. A principle for setting the boundaries of
heightened scrutiny should ideally have two features: it should be relatively
clear (so that one can tell at the outset what is included), and it should bear
some relationship to what it is that makes exactions normatively
problematic.71 Tradeoffs between the two goals may be necessary; a less
good normative fit may be tolerated to produce a much more administrable
test, or a less tractable test might be selected if it aligns much better with
underlying normative concerns.
In crafting tools to define the reach of heightened exactions scrutiny it is
helpful to start by asking a question that the Court in Koontz (and, for that
matter, in Nollan and Dolan) largely ignored: what is it that is problematic
about exactions in the first place? A land use exaction is, at its heart, a
conditional regulation of land use. But why and how does conditionality
raise constitutional worries? The question takes us back to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
A. Unconstitutional Conditions in Land Use
In a previous article, one of us identified three possible problems with
the conditional grant of governmental benefits: (1) “receiving forbidden
goods,” in which the government uses the leverage provided by
conditionally applicable laws to obtain legal entitlements that it is not
authorized to receive; (2) “bargaining with the opponent’s chips,” in which
the government confiscates entitlements belonging to an individual for the
sole purpose of selling them back to that individual; and (3) “appropriations
from third parties,” in which the government obtains desired benefits by
trading away entitlements belonging to third parties whose interests are not
represented in the negotiation.72
71
These two criteria echo in some measure Frank Michelman’s pairing of “settlement costs” and
“demoralization costs” in his analysis of compensable takings. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1214–15
(1967). Just as bright-line rules that mark out distinctive, easily identified cases help to limit the costs of settling
up over compensable takings, so too would a clearly articulated boundary around heightened scrutiny reduce the
costs of administering the system. And just as one would wish for the cases identified for compensation to track
normative concerns like demoralization, so too would one wish for the region of heightened scrutiny to align with
relevant normative criteria.
72
The discussion in this section draws on Fennell, 86 Iowa L Rev at 42–56 (cited in note 61).
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The first problem (receiving forbidden goods) can be illustrated by a
governmentally initiated bargain that would require a person to change her
religion in order to receive government benefits. A commitment to change
one’s religion is not something the government is authorized to receive
from any citizen. This problem, however, is not really implicated by
individually negotiated, conditional land use laws. We do not normally
think of it as improper to sell or give property to government. Indeed,
unlike other contexts in which unconstitutional conditions doctrine might
apply, the Constitution itself explicitly envisions property rights as subject
to (involuntary) alienation to the state for public use upon the payment of
just compensation.
The second potential problem (bargaining with the opponent’s chips) is
readily illustrated by a gunman who threatens “your money or your life”—
entitlements that both belonged to the victim before the gunman came
along. Translated into the land use context, this concern about illicit
appropriations can be more directly addressed by applying a standard
takings analysis to the regulation itself. The Nollan/Dolan analysis,
however, as with unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally, typically
proceeds on the assumption that the government can lawfully decline to
waive the land use restriction in question.73 If this is so, then there has been
no preliminary grab of entitlements, but rather only a legitimate
governmental act in restricting development. Moreover, even if there had
been an illegitimate confiscation of land use rights, nexus and
proportionality would hardly solve the problem.74
Only the third problem (third party effects), is arguably addressed by the
nexus and proportionality doctrine. In theory, these limits could ensure that
the actual costs of development are properly remediated through connected
and commensurate concessions, rather than left to fall on third parties while
the government reaps (or confers on others) unrelated benefits. But this is
not the typical exactions case. Exactions claims under Nollan and Dolan
are brought by regulated landowners, not by neighbors who were
unrepresented in the negotiations and who object to the bargain that was
struck.75
73

See Nollan, 438 US at 835–36.
See, for example, Fennell, 86 Iowa L Rev at 53 (cited in note 61) (observing that the fact that a
misappropriated good can only be swapped for connected and proportionate benefits does not do anything to
address the initial misappropriation).
75
This presumably follows from the nature of the alleged constitutional violation, which is premised on
some property of the landowner being taken (or proposed to be taken) without just compensation. A neighbor or
other third party would not be able to claim that specific constitutional injury. See Fenster, 92 Cal L Rev at 655 n
228 (cited in note 61) (“It is the expropriation of the property owner's land, not effects on anyone else's land, that
leads the Court to apply the Takings Clause in Nollan and Dolan.”). However, neighbors and third parties can and
do bring claims that land use bargaining practices, including incentive and contract zoning, violate other
principles of law. See, for example, Municipal Art Society of New York v City of New York, 522 NYS2d 800,
803–04 (NY Sup Ct 1987) (striking down incentive zoning plan following challenge from third party, on the
ground it amounted to an improper sale of zoning); Hartnett v Austin, 93 So 2d 86, 89–90 (Fla 1956) (allowing a
74
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There is a fourth possibility, which we might understand as straddling
the boundary between the second and third categories: that conditional
regulations are objectionable because of the potential they create for
government favoritism or even outright corruption. The prototypical
exaction—the exchange of some landowner-supplied benefit for regulatory
relief—is structurally very similar to the prototypical bribe. The key
distinction between the two is the end to which the landowner-supplied
benefit is directed. If the demand for that benefit is directed towards the
pursuit of a legitimate public purpose, the demand is not a bribe. If it is
directed towards the regulator’s (or some favored third party’s) private
benefit, then it is “corruption.”76
As with the “bargaining with the opponent’s chips” scenario, improper
government favoritism requires the existence of legal roadblocks in order to
thrive. Roadblocks generate the possibility for government favoritism and
corruption when removing them is both highly discretionary and privately
beneficial.77 And, as with the “appropriations from third parties” scenario,
government favoritism and corruption have harmful effects on disfavored
third parties. The two scenarios come together in the following way: the
government places roadblocks in front of landowners that it fully expects to
remove at some price, but the price that it charges any particular landowner
will determine whether that landowner foots more or less than her share of
the costs associated with development.78 The focus of this objection,
however, is not only on distributive consequences, but also on the nature of
the government action.
The structural similarity between exactions and corruption is the marker
of a larger problem, one that the exactions device may raise even in the
absence of any evidence of government corruption or favoritism. The
problem stems from the very flexibility that the exactions device is designed
to create, which may operate in tension with principles of rule of law.
B. Rule of Law
Theorists working in divergent political and philosophical traditions
neighboring third party to challenge a zoning amendment that embedded a collateral contract requirement). See
also Fenster, 92 Cal L Rev at 655 n 228 (cited in note 61) (discussing and collecting cites on possible bases for
third-party challenges).
76
See, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed, International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption
xvii (Edward Elgar 2006) (“In the most common [corrupt] transaction a private individual or firm makes a
payment to a public official in return for a benefit.”).
77
See Edward L. Glaeser and Raven E. Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J Pub Econ 1053, 1055 (2006)
(“The benefits of corruption come from government actors being able to allocate resources, including the right to
bypass certain regulations, to private individuals.”).
78
The question of what constitutes a party’s proper share is itself subject to debate. See, for example,
Joseph L. Sax, The Property Rights Sweepstakes: Has Anyone Held the Winning Ticket? 34 Vt L Rev 157, 163–
65 (2009) (examining the different fairness intuitions that follow from a resource allocation rule based on space,
rather than time).
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have emphasized the importance of the rule of law.79 The most influential
accounts focus on several distinctive features deemed vital to law’s ability
to sustain a society of free and equal persons. The rule of law fosters
freedom by increasing the predictability and intelligibility of the regulatory
landscape within which the citizen operates and by constraining officials
from exercising unfettered discretion.80 Rawls argues that the rule of law
“constitute[s] grounds upon which persons can rely on one another and
rightly object when their expectations are not fulfilled. If the bases of these
claims are unsure, so are the boundaries of men’s liberties.”81 Scott Shapiro
summarizes this line of thought nicely when he says that the rule of law
“enables members of the community to predict official activity and hence to
plan their lives effectively,” and, at the same time, “constrains official
behavior and hence protects citizens from arbitrary and discriminatory
actions by officials.”82
In addition to asserting its intrinsic connection to equality and liberty,
theorists have posited that adherence to the rule of law generates a number
of consequential benefits. Some have argued, for example, that excessive
disregard of the forms of legality has a corrosive effect on citizens’ respect
for the law and on their willingness to follow it.83 Others have argued that
the rule of law fosters the kind of stability and predictability necessary for
economic development.84
Lon Fuller’s discussion of the “inner morality of law” is typical in terms
of the formal features it identifies as crucial to the rule of law. 85 Fuller
identifies eight ways that state action may deviate from the rule of law.
Those are: (1) a failure to generate generally applicable rules (“generality”),
79
See, for example, F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 133–161 (University of Chicago 1960)
(discussing the ability of the state, under certain conditions, to prevent coercion through law by creating a “private
sphere” for the individual) ; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 235–43 (Belknap 1971); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond
the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 Geo Wash L Rev 149, 149–52 (1987) (“There is no
question that the rule of law is a necessary condition for a sane and just society … [I]t is a very different question
to ask whether it is sufficient to achieve that result.”); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of
Procedure *10–12 (New York University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series
Working Paper No 10-73, Oct 2010), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688491 (visited Nov 6, 2013) (discussing
the importance of procedure, particularly in adjudicative settings, for administering the rule of law).
80
See Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 395-96 (Belknap 2011); see also Hanoch Dagan, Reconstructing American
Legal Realism & Rethinking Private Law Theory ch. 9 (Oxford 2013).
81
Rawls, A Theory at 235 (cited in note 79).
82
Shapiro, Legality, at 395-96.
83
See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39–40 (Yale rev ed 1969).
84
See, for example, Kenneth W. Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic
Development, chs 1, 10 (Brookings 2006).
85
See Fuller, The Morality at 39–43 (cited in note 83). This is not to suggest that Fuller’s are the only
possible requirements for satisfaction of the requirements of the rule of law, or that the only requirements are
formal (as opposed to substantive). See generally Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, ___ Iowa L.
Rev.___ (forthcoming 2013) online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2203735 (last visited
December 6, 2013) (arguing against a conception of the rule of law as exclusively formal). Jeremy Waldron
similarly points out that, in addition to the formal features Fuller identifies, rule of law is also associated with
procedural principles, such “a right to hear reasons” for a decision, and substantive principles, such as “respect for
private property”. See Waldron, Procedure at *1-5 (cited in note 79).
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“so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis;” (2) a failure to
publicize the law; (3) excessive use of retroactive legislation; (4) the use of
rules that are not intelligible; (5) the enactment of rules that contradict one
another; (6) use of rules that are beyond the power of the regulated party to
follow; (7) changing rules too frequently; and (8) permitting “a failure of
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual
administration.”86
Several of these deviations are present in the exactions context,
particularly where the terms of exactions are not spelled out in advance or,
in other words, where they are negotiated with landowners on a case-bycase basis. To the extent that different developers are offered different
deals in exchange for regulatory relief, there is a failure of generality.
When the terms on which the state actor is willing to grant regulatory relief
is communicated to different developers privately, there is a failure of
publicity. To the extent that exactions rely on frequent changes in the
applicable zoning law, there may be excessive instability. And, where
developers are frequently offered regulatory relief on an ad hoc basis, there
can be a pervasive failure of congruence between the rules on the books and
way the rules are actually applied.87
Understanding heightened scrutiny for exactions through the lens of a
concern with the rule of law has the virtue of tying the third-party
appropriations threatened by land use regulatory bargains to the landowners
most likely to become actual Nollan/Dolan claimants: relatively
inexperienced developers who feel abused by the land use process. Their
objection, on this view, is not to land use regulations as such, but to the
degree of regulatory discretion surrounding land use bargains. Excessive
discretion renders the law opaque to the unsophisticated and permits
officials to strike vastly different deals with different landowners,
demanding much less from favored landowners in exchange for the waiver
of regulatory burdens.88 This differential treatment smacks of arbitrariness
and can easily shade into favoritism and corruption. Lurking in the
86
Fuller, The Morality, at 39. Fuller’s list is perhaps the best known of the “laundry lists” of principles
generated to capture formal requirements of the rule of law. See Waldron, Procedure at *3 (cited in note 79).
87
There is also a form of retroactivity at work in exactions, insofar as changes in conditions or requirements
deviate from what was required at earlier points, when the property was purchased or when expectations were
formed. To some extent this is an inherent feature of the need to apply law that is responsive to changing
conditions to an enduring asset; it is not unique to the exactions context. However, the concerns associated with
retroactivity gather added force in the exactions context if the rules for obtaining a permit can be unexpectedly
changed in ways that are known (and indeed designed) to disadvantage particular parties based on their past
conduct (here, investments in land)
88
Note, however, that the facts in Nollan itself do not fully square with this interpretation, insofar as the
same lateral easement condition was consistently required of other landowners along the same stretch of
beachfront. See Nollan, 483 US at 829 (observing that the Commission reported similarly conditioning “43 out of
60 coastal development permits along the same tract of land”; of the others, “14 had been approved when the
Commission did not have administrative regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the
remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property.”).
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background is the possibility that favored landowners may have become so
for improper reasons. Even when nefarious behavior is absent, the
existence of bargaining around the law on the books may create the
impression among outsiders that mischief is at work.
By imposing the limits of nexus and proportionality in its exactions
cases, the Court might be understood as attempting to structure bargaining
between governments and developers in ways that increase the conformity
of that bargaining to the formal requirements of the rule of law. On this
account, the exactions criteria impose (admittedly broad) outer limits on the
relative disadvantage that favorable land use deals (which are obviously not
going to be challenged by the favored developers) can afflict on disfavored
landowners. The exactions test might thereby act as a crude price cap on the
waiver of discretionary land use regulations.89 Arguably, this cap attacks
both the corruption problem (by reducing the value of the bargained-for
discretionary override) and the horizontal equity problem (by limiting the
potential gaps in burdens the state can impose on permit applicants).
This rule-of-law account of the exactions jurisprudence mirrors
discussions of eminent domain’s public use requirement, especially
following Kelo v City of New London.90 Arguments about public use in the
economic redevelopment context have frequently cited the danger of
governmental favoritism towards powerful and well-connected private
interests to justify limiting the scope of eminent domain.91 This focus is
also consistent with the general thrust of substantive due process review,
89
The “rough proportionality” portion of the test seems most plausibly related to this price-capping function,
but the “essential nexus” requirement could make regulatory burdens easier to evaluate by limiting the
complexity, reach, and heterogeneity of deal making in a given context.
90
545 US 469 (2005). Kelo involved a group of property owners who challenged New London,
Connecticut’s use of eminent domain as part of an economic redevelopment scheme. See id at 473–76. The
property owners argued that taking property that was not blighted to give to private developers for the purpose of
economic development was not a valid “public use.” See id at 475–76. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge,
affirming prior cases holding the Takings Clause’s “public use” requirement to permit the state to pursue through
the use of eminent domain any public purpose (including economic development) that it could legitimately pursue
through other means. See id at 483–84. See also Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 240–43 (1984);
Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 33–36 (1954). As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put it for the unanimous Court in
Midkiff, “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” 467
US at 240.
91
For example, in a summary of the anti-Kelo backlash five years after the case was decided, the propertyrights litigators at the Institute for Justice framed the conflict in terms of unequal political influence:

The parties who gain from eminent domain abuse—in particular, local government officials
and financially powerful private business interests—have disproportionate influence in the
political arena. Not surprisingly, those groups have fought hard against eminent domain
reform in virtually every state where it has been proposed. Given their tremendous
influence, as well as the fact that ordinary home and business owners do not have lobbyists
or special access, the question that the critics should be asking is: “How on earth did the
Kelo backlash meet with such success?”
Five Years After Kelo: The Sweeping Backlash Against One of the Supreme Court’s Most-Despised Decisions *5
(Institute for Justice 2010), online at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/private_property/kelo/kelo5year_annwhite_paper.pdf (visited Nov 11, 2013).
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which aims to root out situations in which the government acts arbitrarily
and in ways that cannot be justified (even minimally) by reference to
permissible government purposes. The Court has employed a similar
approach in its equal protection jurisprudence.92 A conclusion that
government policy or distinction is not rationally related to a permissible
government purpose, like a finding of no public use in eminent domain,
often implies that government is impermissibly serving some private agenda
(such as corruption or animus) at the expense of the public good.93
C. Some Wrinkles and Qualifications
Rule-of-law concerns, broadly construed, seem to offer a theoretically
grounded normative explanation for the Nollan/Dolan inquiry. But it is not
entirely clear that these concerns map well onto the way that inquiry has
been structured. Moreover, certain features associated with rule of law may
clash with normatively valuable aspects of the way that land use control is
carried out—or indeed with other rule-of-law principles. The sections
below explore these issues.
1. The Problem of Favoritism
The Nollan/Dolan inquiry does not target favoritism directly. It does
not engage in the sort of comparative analysis that one would expect from
an inquiry motivated by horizontal equity. Instead, in considering
challenges by disfavored developers, the Nollan/Dolan analysis focuses on
nexus and proportionality within the challenged deal only.94 Moreover, even
if nexus and proportionality would produce a general tendency toward more
equal deal making when consistently applied to all development-related
deals, there is reason to doubt such consistency will actually obtain.
Significantly, the kinds of developers who seem most likely to be
Nollan/Dolan claimants are relatively inexperienced, one-time players, not
the kinds of sophisticated repeat-actors interested in maintaining favorable
relationships with local governments.
The similarity – both in terms of normative underpinnings and legal content – between the substantive due
process and equal protection inquiries is most apparent in the so-called “class of one” equal protection cases,
where the claimant alleges she has been singled out arbitrarily for adverse treatment. See, e.g., Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (“[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination” (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1927)). But see Engquist v.
Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (refusing to apply a “class of one” analysis to situations in which
government action is necessarily “subjective and individualized” as in the context of public employment).
93
See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga L Rev 1, 31–32 (2008) (suggesting that an
“orientation to the public good” is a necessary feature of law; thus, “we might say that nothing is law unless it
purports to promote the public good” even if it does not always manage to do so).
94
Arguably, evidence about other, more favorable deals might come in as part of the consideration of the
proportionality prong of the test.
92
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Here it becomes important to underscore the difference between the
allocation of proof burdens in the Nollan/Dolan framework and in other
contexts that present concerns about favoritism. In the areas of substantive
due process, equal protection, and eminent domain, courts approach their
inquiries with a great deal of deference and with the burden of proof
squarely on the shoulders of the party challenging the government’s bona
fides. In the exactions context, the presumption is reversed. A primary
effect of designating such a domain of heightened scrutiny is to induce
governmental avoidance of litigation within that domain. This might occur
either openly, by causing governments to shift towards forms of regulation
that lie outside the realm of intensified scrutiny,95 or covertly, by steering
their bargaining efforts towards parties who can be trusted not to sue.96
The Nollan/Dolan framework therefore generates the costs of
heightened scrutiny while leaving a great deal of space for backroom deals.
Indeed, the test (particularly if it extends too widely) may well exacerbate
the problem of horizontal inequity by making land use regulators reluctant
to propose horse-trading with anyone but those least likely to turn to the
courts for redress: repeat-play developers.97 Expansive Nollan/Dolan
scrutiny, as currently formulated, might well have the effect of driving
bargaining underground, which in turn may convert publicly motivated
bargaining over regulatory burdens into a furtive act that does more (and
not less) to undermine the rule of law.98
We might imagine courts using rule-of-law considerations to construct
safe harbors (or domains of less-intense scrutiny) into which local
governments would be encouraged to channel their regulatory activity. In
the eminent domain context, for example, the Court has treated the
connection of a land use decision to a lengthy and public planning process
as a reason for judicial deference.99 The Court’s exactions jurisprudence
does not currently incorporate this consideration—either in the substantive
nexus and proportionality analysis, or in setting boundaries for the
application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. Nonetheless, it is possible that
95
An analogous point has been made about heightened standards for public use in the eminent domain
context, given that governments have the capacity to select alternative ways of achieving their objectives. See, for
example, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 Colum L Rev 1412, 1416
(2006) (“The Achilles heel of the anti-Kelo movement is its failure to consider the place of the public use doctrine
within the full arsenal of government regulatory powers over property.”).
96
See Dana, 75 NC L Rev at 1286–99 (cited in note 37) (suggesting that Nollan/Dolan restrictions can be
circumvented through local governments’ reliance on repeat-play developers who can be trusted not to bring legal
challenges).
97
See id.
98
See Rose-Ackerman, ed, International Handbook at xviii (cited in note 76) (discussing the role
governmental discretion plays in generating low-level corruption).
99
See Kelo,545 US at 483–84 (emphasizing that the government’s condemnation of land was undertaken
pursuant to a lengthy and public planning process as a reason for finding the use to be sufficiently public). See
also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 Ecology L Q 443, 448 (2007) (“[I]n both regulatory
takings and public use cases, the Court often has cited governmental planning efforts to bolster the case for
judicial deference.”).
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planning (or other procedures thought to undercut favoritism) could be used
to help distinguish the realm within which the usual deferential stance
should govern from the one in which heightened scrutiny prevails.100
2. Overreaching Against Landowners Generally
So far, our description of the rule-of-law account of exactions
jurisprudence might create the misimpression that the only axis of conflict
is between different would-be developers. But characterizing exactions
conflicts in this way would disregard the potential for conflict between a
political majority and all those who stand to gain by developing land. Fears
that majoritarian interests will overburden property owners lie at the heart
of the Takings Clause’s protections, and concern about governmental
overreaching (as opposed to differential reaching) is evident in the Court’s
exactions jurisprudence. Thus, some justices may locate the normative
considerations underlying the exactions cases not (just) in concerns about
the rule of law posed by government’s offers of disparate deals for different
landowners, but (also) in the more straightforward potential for the
government to abuse landowners (whether en masse or individually)
through excessively burdensome land use regulation.101
For reasons already suggested in the “bargaining with the opponent’s
chips” critique, restrictions on exactions are not especially well-suited to
deal with the problem of regulatory excess. Significantly, constraining
governmental deal making is not the same as decreasing the average or total
regulatory burden.
It is certainly possible that constraining the
government’s ability to bargain away restrictions would make the
government less interested in imposing the restrictions in the first place.102
But it is equally plausible that governments prohibited from bargaining will
impose burdens on owners that are (on balance) the same, or perhaps even
greater, than they would impose if they were able to negotiate customized
packages of benefits and burdens with individual landowners. This is
particularly true for local governments motivated, as William Fischel has
100
See Shapiro, Legality, 195, 394-95 (discussing the conceptual links between planning, legality, and the
rule of law).
101
For example, Justice Clarence Thomas asserted in dissent from the denial of certiorari in Parking
Association of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), that “the general applicability of the
ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis,” and illustrated his point by observing it would clearly be a
taking “if Atlanta had seized several hundred homes in order to build a freeway.” 515 US 1116, 1118 (1995)
(Thomas dissenting).
102
Alienability restrictions have sometimes been proposed as a way to address strategic behavior by private
actors, by removing the incentive to acquire an entitlement for leverage purposes only. For example, see
generally, Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 Harv L Rev 1403 (2009); Ian Ayres and Kristin
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U Pa L Rev 45 (1999).
Governmental bodies may enact land use restrictions, including inefficient ones, for a variety of reasons other than
gaining bargaining leverage. See text accompanying notes 60–61. See also Fennell, 122 Harv L Rev at 1455
(discussing and critiquing the use of alienability limits to address insincere lawmaking in the land use context).
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hypothesized, by risk aversion about the value of voters’ homes.103 Thus,
the possibility of tyranny by a local antidevelopment majority, which
Fischel has argued is particularly salient in locally enacted land use law,104
would not justify singling out exactions (as opposed to local land use law
generally) for special scrutiny.
While a standard takings analysis of the burdens placed on landowners
may offer a more direct and fruitful way to approach this problem, bargains
may muddy the waters in ways that could call for special scrutiny.
Consider, for example, the rise of community benefit agreements. These
private agreements between developers and community groups promise
surrounding stakeholders specific benefits, such as jobs or local amenities,
in exchange for their acquiescence in the development plan.105 While local
governments may view these agreements as a politically attractive way of
collaboratively addressing the concerns of the community, the very
involvement of government can produce risks. If channeling benefits
directly to third parties becomes a de facto requirement of development
approval, bargains could generate burdens (and not just benefits) for
developers that are not apparent from an examination of regulatory
impositions alone.106 Such opaque burdens would raise many of the same
concerns that we have already discussed.
Here it becomes helpful to separate two inquiries that can become
entangled in land use bargains. The first, which standard takings analysis is
well equipped to handle, is the severity of the burden that is imposed on a
given landowner or group of landowners. The second is whether the
government’s overall dealings with landowners are consistent with the rule
of law, which is an inquiry that goes to the fit between the procedural and
substantive framework the government has established and the legitimate
goals of the governmental entity. This is the kind of inquiry that, by the
Court’s own doctrinal lights, sounds in due process; the question is whether
the government is acting properly. The connection between the two
questions emerges in takings cases in the following way: one of the ways in
which rule of law might be undermined is through bargaining processes that
make it impossible to answer the first question accurately and that therefore
make it too difficult for courts to police against violations of the Takings
Clause’s protections against excessive regulatory burdens.
The Nollan/Dolan criteria do not really address this problem. Their
brand of heightened scrutiny is anchored in a Takings Clause application of
103

William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 8–10 (Harvard 2001).
See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings 276–88 (Harvard 1995).
105
See, for example, Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U Chi L Rev 5, 5–6 (2010).
106
See, for example, id at 27–28 (discussing the possibility that approval by community groups might be an
implicit requirement for development approval, and the associated legal implications).
104
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the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that depends on first identifying
some governmental act that would qualify as an uncompensated taking if
divorced from the bargaining context.107 The concerns associated with rule
of law, including the concern that impermissibly severe uncompensated
burdens will be obscured by the bargaining apparatus, do not depend on
first identifying such an uncompensated taking.108 The distinctions drawn in
the underlying takings doctrine that are considered critical to the question of
burden severity—such as the one drawn in Loretto between physical takings
and purely regulatory ones—have no bearing on whether the government is
acting improperly in its dealings with landowners. Instead, those
distinctions go only to the compensability or noncompensability of burdens
imposed by governmental actors engaged in legitimate governmental acts.
There is therefore a fundamental mismatch between the Nollan/Dolan
goals of ferreting out bad government behavior (that, among other things,
might allow it to take from owners in a tricky or sneaky manner) and the
presumption of the Takings Clause that the governmental conduct in
question is otherwise legitimate but burdensome enough to require
compensation. Because bad behavior is notoriously shape-shifting and
opportunistic, the tools for addressing it cannot be found in a toolkit
devoted to categorizing and evaluating burdens for compensation purposes.
What is instead required are principles that can channel governmental
behavior along lines that reduce problems like obfuscation and corruption—
problems that lie outside the domain of the Takings Clause.109
3. The Cost of Reducing Flexibility.
Perhaps the largest concern with using a rule-of-law approach to mark
out the edges of heightened scrutiny is its potential tendency to swallow the
entire field of land use control. We have already shown how bargains
permeate the whole of land use regulation, and have emphasized the
conditionality and tentativeness inherent in the state’s approach to a
resource as unique, enduring, and essential as land.
If conditionality and bargaining are pervasive in land use law, and if
such conditionality raises significant rule of law concerns, why not just say
so much the worse for land use regulation? That is, why not just extend
exactions scrutiny to land use regulation across the board? Taken to the
extreme, doing so could make land use regulation prohibitively costly—a
107

See Part IV.A.3.
Conversely, identifying an act that would be a taking if viewed in isolation outside of the bargaining
context does not necessarily establish the existence of a constitutionally impermissible burden, since the bargain
itself may supply the just compensation. See Part IV.A.4.
109
We will suggest below that the Due Process Clause offers the most suitable home for this inquiry See
Part V.E.1.
108
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bad result for landowners and government alike. A more modest approach,
some incarnations of which we will consider below, would attempt to bleed
the discretion out of the land use process by applying elevated scrutiny only
to those land use regulations that fail to satisfy rule-of-law criteria like
generalizability and publicity—that is, actions that are ad hoc rather than
legislative in character. The effect of applying heightened exactions
scrutiny in this way would not be an unmitigated good, however. A likely
result would be a net decrease in the flexibility and customizability of local
land use laws, as compared to existing practices.
Efforts to specify and address all variations and contingencies in
advance can make lawmaking unnecessarily cumbersome and costly. At the
same time, inflexibly applying a single set of land use rules to every parcel
itself risks undermining the rule of law by treating differently situated
people the same.110 Moreover, as even Fuller recognized, blanket rules that
are a poor fit for individualized conditions can spur frequent amendments
(instability) or encourage gaps between the law on the books and law as
applied (incongruence).111 Fuller’s account of rule of law also suggests a
crucial and robust role for market institutions and exchange—one in which
heterogeneity of interests makes possible gains from trade. 112 The
inefficiencies that may be associated with blocked bargains between
landowners and governments can threaten rule-of-law values by generating
pressure (in the form of unexploited surplus) toward illicit deals.
Reducing discretion can also interfere with the ability of governments to
appropriately price land use impacts—including positive ones. This
consideration becomes increasingly important as the nation’s population
becomes overwhelmingly urbanized. Agglomeration benefits and
congestion costs make the relative spatial placement of people, buildings,
and uses—especially within cities—crucially important.113 As John Logan
110
See Gowder, Equal Law, at 11-14. Of course, this possibility focuses our attention on the question of
how to identify the sorts of differences that the law can appropriately take into account when justifying
differential treatment. For instance, it would seem appropriate for the law to treat two parcels differently because
of their drainage characteristics, but not because of the racial makeup of the residents of the neighborhood. See
id. Identifying policy-relevant differences requires adopting or developing a theory of the kinds of “public
reasons” on the basis of which the state is entitled to act. Such an undertaking, which in turn requires grappling
with competing accounts of what is entailed by state rationality and nonarbitrariness, is beyond the scope of this
paper. Related questions often arise in tax policy discussions. See Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of
Ownership: Taxes and Justice 12 (Oxford, 2002) (referencing “the principle that like-situated persons must be
burdened equally and relevantly unlike persons unequally”).
111
See Fuller, The Morality at 39 (cited in note 83).
112
See Fuller, The Morality at 22–24 (cited in note 83).
113
The benefits of agglomeration (including transportation savings, knowledge spillovers and specialization
gains), have long been recognized. See, for example, Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 328–29
(Macmillan 1890); J. Vernon Henderson, Urban Scale Economies, in Ronan Paddison, ed, Handbook of Urban
Studies 243, 243–48 (SAGE 2001). For recent discussions of tradeoffs between agglomeration benefits and
congestion costs in city formation and growth, see generally, Luís M.A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in
Cities, 340 Science 1438 (2013); Jeffrey C. Brinkman, Congestion, Agglomeration, and The Structure of Cities
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No 13-25, May 2013), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272049 (visited Nov 15, 2013). For a discussion connecting agglomeration effects to the
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and Harvey Molotch put it in their classic work on the political economy of
land use, “[e]very parcel of land is unique in the idiosyncratic access it
provides to other parcels and uses . . . . In economists’ language, each
property use ‘spills over’ to other parcels and, as part of these ‘externality
effects,’ crucially determines what every other property will be.”114 A local
government intent on maximizing positive synergies within cities will not
want to charge everyone the same regulatory “price” to locate or develop in
a given place.115 Applying heightened exactions scrutiny too broadly could
thus reduce local governments’ ability to use forms of differential pricing
—carried out through individualized bargaining and other flexibilityenhancing devices—to manage agglomeration effects.116
As this discussion suggests, rule-of-law considerations in the abstract
cannot tell us where to strike the balance between flexibility and
predictability.117 But these considerations can tell us what sort of inquiry is
required. This, in turn, can help us identify the best doctrinal hook for the
analysis and, as important, can point up the shortcomings of existing
approaches.
***
It is noteworthy that many state courts, years before the Supreme Court
entered the fray, perceived the need to police bargaining in the land use
context.118 Like Nollan/Dolan, these state law exactions tests typically took
the form of an evaluation of the fit between the conditions imposed and the
impact of the proposed land use.119 To be sure, many of these tests did not
burden local governments with levels of scrutiny as demanding as those
law and economics of cities, see generally David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U Ill
L Rev 1507 (2010). Parties differ in the agglomeration benefits they contribute to urban environments (and may
have differential effects on the congestion that limits the ability to add others to the same area). See, for example,
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev
211, 215–16, 241-43 (2012) (noting the asymmetry in positive externalities bestowed by larger businesses on
their smaller neighbors).
114
John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place 23–24
(University of California 20th ann ed 2007).
115
In this sense, regulating land uses resembles the task of putting together an entering class in a law school
or university: Some would-be students will add more to the group and so receive lower prices (e.g., scholarships)
while others will add less to the group and thus will be required to pay full sticker price. See, for example,
Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Education and Other Services
in Which the Customers are Inputs, 103 J Polit Econ 573, 575–76 (1995). For reflections on imperfections in the
“location market” within cities, see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez and David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19
Geo Mason L Rev 637 (2012).
116
See Ronit Levine-Schnur, Koontz, Bargained Land Development, and the Rationales of Land Use Law
*47–52 (unpublished article, Apr 2013), online at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/KoontzBargained.pdf (visited Nov
14, 2013) (proposing an approach to exactions jurisprudence that would take into account differential
contributions to and draws from urban surpluses).
117
Shapiro, Legality, 398 (cited in note 80) (“Legal systems have no choice but to decide how to balance the
needs for guidance, predictability, and constraint on the one hand against the benefits of flexibility, spontaneity,
and discretion on the other. Legal systems, therefore, not only must heed the Rule of Law but also must have
views about how the Rule of Law itself is best heeded.”).
118
See Dolan, 512 US at 389–91 (discussing state law exactions scrutiny).
119
See id.
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established in Nollan and Dolan.120 Yet despite their differences, the
existence of state-law exactions doctrine suggests a widespread perception
that land use regulatory deal making constitutes a discrete and problematic
identifiable category of governmental action in need of judicial oversight.
We have suggested that this perception may find normative footing in ruleof-law concerns. While those normative roots fit imperfectly with exactions
jurisprudence as it has developed, they may nonetheless offer useful
guidance going forward.
IV. SEARCHING FOR LIMITS WITHIN KOONTZ
Having surveyed the normative terrain, we can return to the hard
question of how the Court might cabin its exactions jurisprudence given its
dual goals of protecting meaningful land use regulation and restraining local
land use power. In this Part, we turn explicitly to the Koontz decision for
insight into the limiting principles that remain open to the Court, as well as
the ones that it seems to have foreclosed.
Before Koontz, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and substantive
takings law seemed to embed constraints on the reach of Nollan and Dolan.
A claimant seeking heightened means-ends exactions scrutiny would first
need to clear two preliminary hurdles. For starters, she would need to show
that the government was attempting to bargain—expressly offering to
release the landowner from a discretionary regulatory burden in exchange
for some valuable concession by the landowner. Second, she would have to
show that the concession sought by the government was one that would, on
its own, violate the Takings Clause if simply imposed by the state.
Lingle and Del Monte Dunes further hinted that only those land use
interactions that cleared these two hurdles in the clearest and most
prototypical way—bargains initiated through an ad hoc or adjudicative
process to appropriate tangible interests in real property—would trigger
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.121 The ad hoc element would have limited the
exactions doctrine to the most unambiguous of bargains: those that were
available only to particular landowners on an individually negotiated, caseby-case basis. Limiting the doctrine to demands for physical interests in
real property would have reserved heightened exactions scrutiny for
demands that constitute clear per se takings—ones that many perceive to
represent a uniquely intrusive kind of burden.122
120
See, for example, Jenad, Inc v Village of Scarsdale, 218 NE2d 673, 676 (NY 1966) (partial abrogation by
Dolan recognized in Twin Lakes Development Corp v Town of Monroe, 801 NE2d 821, 826 (NY 2003)).
121
See Part I.C.
122
See Lingle v Chevron, 544 US 528, 538 (2005) (“The Court has held that physical takings require
compensation because of the unique burden they impose . . . .”). Although limiting qualifying burdens to physical
takings might seem arbitrary, it tracks a quirk in the underlying takings jurisprudence: the categorical treatment
that permanent physical occupations receive under Loretto, which diverges dramatically from the Penn Central
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In Koontz, however, the Court jettisoned the requirement of a physical
exaction and remained conspicuously silent (despite prodding from the
dissent) about where it stood on the legislative/adjudicative distinction.123
With one limit clearly off the table and the second deferred to another day,
what can we discern from the Koontz opinion about the possible boundary
principles it meant to apply? Such limits might relate either to the nature of
the concession or burden the government demands, or to the nature of the
interaction or bargain between the government and the landowner. The
sections below examine the Court’s treatment of each of these dimensions.
A. Burden-Related Limits
The Koontz majority decisively rejected the distinction between
physical exactions of land and monetary exactions. It also indicated that it
viewed at least some subset of monetary impositions connected to
identifiable land as per se takings. But it left several crucial questions
unanswered that will have profound implications for the scope of
heightened exactions scrutiny and for takings analysis more generally. First,
what distinguishes the monetary obligations that trigger exactions scrutiny
from those that do not? Second, what is the status, for purposes of exactions
analysis, of in-kind regulatory burdens that are neither physical
appropriations of land nor monetary impositions? Third, and closely
related, is it still necessary for a burden to constitute a “taking on its own”
in order to trigger heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan—and if so,
what does “on its own” mean? Fourth, what role, if any, does in-kind
compensation play in thinking about the constitutional foundations of
exactions analysis?
1. Which monetary obligations?
The Koontz majority held that conditioning development on a monetary
obligation triggers heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. But which
monetary obligations qualify for this treatment? Because there is no clear
indication that the Court meant to jettison the requirement that the burden in
question constitute a taking on its own—a point we will revisit below—we
might start by supposing that only those monetary impositions that
constitute per se takings will trigger heightened scrutiny. This approach gets
us little traction, however.
Until Koontz itself, monetary impositions were not thought to constitute
treatment that usually governs regulatory takings inquiries, as well as from the treatment that most monetary
burdens had heretofore received. See Part I.A.
123
We will take up below the possibility that the Court might ultimately adopt the legislative/adjudicative
distinction it dodged in Koontz. See Part V.A.
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takings at all, much less per se takings, outside of very limited contexts.
The relatively narrow exception articulated in Brown v. Legal Foundation
of Washington124 involved situations in which the government seized some
discrete pool of money (in Brown, the interest earned by a particular trust
account). The basis for this exception has never fully been fleshed out by
the Court, but its scope was typically understood to be self-limiting.125 Even
the plurality in Eastern Enterprises only concluded that the monetary
obligation in that case worked a taking after going through the Penn Central
analysis.126
Koontz thus moved into uncharted waters by suggesting that generalized
monetary obligations tied to identifiable land (or some not-fully-specified
subset of such monetary impositions) count as per se takings. Justice Alito’s
opinion for the majority expressly refers to the petitioner’s case as being
premised on a per se taking of money, citing Brown.127 Later, he states that
“any such demand [for a monetary expenditure linked to land] would
amount to a per se taking similar to the taking of an easement or a lien.”128
But all monetary obligations imposed on land holdings, including such
ubiquitous tools as property taxes, special assessments and permitting fees,
share this connection to ownership of specific parcels of land.129 And the
Koontz majority insists that it does not mean to sweep all of these
impositions into the compass of exactions scrutiny.
We know, then, that some subset (and only some subset) of monetary
impositions tied to land now qualify as per se takings that will trigger
exactions analysis. But the Koontz majority does not articulate any principle
that would distinguish the routine impositions it means to exempt from
heightened scrutiny from the sorts of land-related monetary obligations it
intended to subject to heightened scrutiny. Justice Alito’s opinion instead
points to the Court’s distinction between takings and taxes in Brown as
proof that such a distinction is possible—without acknowledging the sea
change in the coverage of Brown that the Koontz opinion itself seems to
work.130
The majority also finds reassurance in state court cases defining
“taxes.”131 But these cases typically involve judicial efforts to interpret
state-law restrictions on local governments’ power to tax, restrictions
124

538 U.S. 216 (2003).
See Merrill, 86 Va L Rev at 903-07 (cited in note 52).
126
See Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 522-23.
127
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600.
128
Id.
129
See id at 2606-07 (Kagan dissenting).
130
Perhaps suggestive is the Court’s explanation of why the monetary imposition in Brown could not have
been a tax, due to state law: “in Washington, taxes are levied by the legislature, not the courts.” Koontz, 133 S.
Ct. at 2601. This explanation carries a hint of the legislative/adjudicative distinction that the Koontz majority
studiously avoided drawing, but the idea is not developed further.
131
See id. at 2602 n3.
125
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generally understood not to reach things like “fees.”132 The Koontz Court
apparently meant to shield both taxes and fees (at least routine user fees)
from heightened scrutiny.133 The boundaries of state delegations of
revenue-raising power to local governments seem entirely orthogonal to the
meaning of a federal constitutional provision focused on the relationship
between individual property owners and the state.
A different (if somewhat recursive) way of defining the subset of
monetary impositions subject to heightened scrutiny would make the
imposition’s appearance in a bargaining context relevant to the question.
The idea might be that the government’s choice to isolate a particular
burden by demanding it as a quid pro quo fundamentally alters the way the
burden is understood.
Thus, money demanded in exchange for
development permission is viewed as different than money demanded
unconditionally—with only the former, and not the latter, potentially
amounting to a per se taking.
One piece of evidence for this interpretation is Justice Alito’s puzzling
statement that Koontz’s claim—that a monetary imposition tied to land is a
per se taking—is “more limited” than would be a claim that such a
monetary imposition triggered a Penn Central inquiry.134 How could
declaring a wide swath of monetary impositions to be per se takings be
“more limited” than applying the much more forgiving Penn Central
standard to them? The answer could be that Justice Alito viewed his Koontz
pronouncements about per se takings as somehow limited to the exactions
context rather than applying to the larger realm of takings law. This way of
viewing the case would confine the effects of Koontz to exactions cases, but
it would put increased pressure on the problem of determining which
interactions count as exactions.
The Court in Koontz clearly wanted to treat monetary exactions just like
physical exactions to keep local governments from using the former as a
substitute for the latter. The problem, however, is that physical
appropriations had up until Koontz been treated differently under takings
law than most monetary impositions. To maintain the symmetry between inkind exactions and in-lieu payments by treating both as per se takings, the
Court appears to have significantly widened the domain of takings law as it
132
See, for example, Elizabeth River Crossings OPCO v. Meeks, ___ SE2d ___, Nos. 130954, 130955 (Va.
Oct. 31, 2013) (distinguishing “taxes” from “user fees” and rejecting a claim that the Virginia legislature had
improperly delegated taxing power to a transportation authority responsible for operating a tunnel between
Portsmouth and Norfolk); Silva v City of Attleboro, 908 NE2d 722 (Mass. 2009) (reviewing the standards for
distinguishing taxes from fees for state law purposes and finding that a charge for a burial permit falls in the latter
category and hence was lawfully imposed by the City).
133
133 S Ct at 2600-01 (“It is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees ... are not “takings.”’ . . . . This case
therefore does not affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and
regulations that may impose financial burdens on property owners.”) (quoting Brown, 216 U.S. at 343 n 2) (Scalia
dissenting).
134
See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600.
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applies to monetary obligations.
2. What about regulatory burdens?
Although Koontz’s treatment of monetary impositions has received the
lion’s share of scholarly attention, the case leaves unanswered another
question with far-reaching implications: what about the wide range of
regulatory burdens that are accepted (or proposed) in exchange for
development permission? Many conditions do not take the form of
monetary impositions and also do not amount to physical appropriations of
property. Such in-kind regulatory conditions on development are
ubiquitous, including set-back requirements, parking and landscaping
requirements, limits on hours of operation, and many more. None of these
would be a taking on its own under standard takings analysis. The postKoontz treatment of regulatory burdens, then, depends crucially on another
question that the Court left unanswered in Koontz—the status of the “taking
on its own” requirement.
3. A taking on its own.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is premised on the notion that
the government is asking the claimant to trade away a constitutionally
protected right in order to receive a discretionary government benefit.135
Accordingly, it seems to require a burden that would constitute a taking on
its own if imposed outright. And, indeed, in Nollan and Dolan the Supreme
Court’s application of heightened scrutiny proceeded on the assumption that
the governments had conditioned development approval on the conveyance
by the claimant of an interest in property that the government could not
simply have taken on its own without triggering the duty to pay just
compensation under the Takings Clause.136 As Justice Kagan put it in her
Koontz dissent, Nollan and Dolan “apply only if the demand would have
constituted a taking when executed outside the permitting process.”
Despite the dearth of substantive takings analysis in the majority
opinion, there is no clear indication that the Koontz Court intended to do
away with the requirement that the state’s demand—if unilaterally
135
See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1415 (cited in note 34) (“The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”).
136
See Nollan 483 US at 831 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach . . . we have
no doubt there would have been a taking.”); Dolan, 512 US at 384 (1994) (“Without question, had the city simply
required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant
of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred.”); see also Lingle,
544 US at 546 (“In each case [Nollan and Dolan], the Court began with the premise that, had the government
simply appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per se physical taking.”)
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imposed—constitute a taking on its own. On the contrary, the majority
considered the monetary obligation imposed by the state to be the sort of
state action that would count as a per se taking if imposed by the state. But
retaining the “taking on its own” prerequisite raises the question of how the
idea of “on its own” should be interpreted outside of the specific facts in
Koontz. Interestingly, the Court did not have to confront this question as
long as it limited heightened scrutiny to physical exactions. The Court’s
carve-out in Loretto makes any permanent physical appropriation—no
matter how small, no matter how insignificant in proportion to the rest of
the parcel—a taking on its own. The presence of a physical Loretto taking
has the interesting effect of making the overall context in which the
imposition occurs irrelevant—one can combine a permanent physical
occupation with any other property elements one likes, and it is still a
taking.
By contrast, context is tremendously relevant for the rest of takings
analysis. Penn Central’s framework uses a “parcel as a whole” approach to
determine whether landowners have been saddled with burdens that should
instead be spread across society.137 The infamous “denominator problem”
arises in both Penn Central and Lucas analyses precisely because it is
necessary to consider impositions in a context larger than the regulatory
burden itself.138 If every small regulatory act were treated as a Loretto
taking, regardless of how it were situated within the overall framework of
benefits and burdens, “government hardly could go on.”139
This is even more true where monetary impositions are concerned.
Before Koontz, these had never even been treated as subject to takings
analysis outside of the narrow context of specifically designated funds, liens
placed on specific property, and the like. It is not workable or logically
137

Penn Central, 438 US at 130-31.
A central inquiry in takings analysis is the degree of diminution in value (or, at the extreme, deprivation
of all economically viable use). To determine how much the value of a piece of property has diminished or
whether all economically viable use has been eliminated, one must first establish the base against which the
diminution is to be measured: the denominator. For example, a ten acre plot might be subject to a regulation that
destroys entirely the value of one acre. How much the plot’s value has diminished depends on whether each acre
is considered separately, or whether the whole plot is considered together. See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 US 1003, 1016-17 n 7 (1992) (discussing this difficulty using a similar example and observing that
“uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our ‘deprivation’ fraction has produced inconsistent
pronouncements by the Court”). The Court has, however, rejected “conceptual severance” that would enable a
landowner to define the property interest by reference to the scope of the regulation itself. See Margaret Jane
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum L Rev
1667, 1674-79 (1988).
139
Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes). Oregon’s ill-fated experiment with
Measure 37 demonstrates the unworkability of a compensation requirement that attaches to even the smallest
diminutions in value. Before being largely gutted through the subsequent adoption of Measure 49, Measure 37
required local governments to either lift restrictions that reduced property values or compensate for them. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, local governments overwhelmingly elected the former alternative, essentially making the
regulation of land use impossible to carry on. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do:
Evidence from the Oregon Experiment, 78 Fordham L Rev 1281, 1284 (2009) (“In only one claim, out of the over
7000 Measure 37 claims filed, did the state or municipality choose to compensate the property owners rather than
waive the regulation.”).
138
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cohesive to treat all monetary obligations relating to land as Loretto takings.
Yet to put some obligations outside the Loretto box while leaving others
inside requires a preliminary sorting task that inevitably draws on the
surrounding context and purpose of particular monetary obligations.140
The reason is simple. Very few governmental burdens—including taxes
and fees—would survive even the most deferential constitutional review if
they were examined in isolation from their wider contexts. If the
government summarily ordered you to hand over a certain sum of money, or
to undertake certain costly tasks, this surely would look like some sort of
constitutional violation. But if the sum of money involved were your
property tax liability, or if the task involved simply remediating harmful
conditions on your property, the apparent infirmity would disappear—at
least in the absence of some extraordinary facts not given here. The
difficulty is in determining which aspects of the surrounding context can be
taken into account in deciding whether there is a constitutional right up for
trade that would trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis.
Now that the Court has unmoored Brown from its prior grounding in
specific funds, Loretto takings can no longer be identified in a context-free
way. Yet the Koontz Court was adamant that no Penn Central analysis was
necessary.141 So it would seem that the Court has in mind some
impressionistic initial step, conducted outside of ordinary takings doctrine,
in which it classifies some monetary impositions related to land as Loretto
takings that trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis, and some monetary impositions
as taxes or fees that are wholly exempt from takings analysis.
Whether the Court has in mind a similar preliminary assessment of
conditional regulatory burdens that fall short of permanent physical
occupations is unclear. The same circumvention concerns that led the Court
to reject the distinction between monetary and physical exactions could lead
the Court to reject an interpretation that would immunize non-Loretto
regulatory burdens from exactions scrutiny. Here too, the Court’s desire for
consistency in the exactions arena may clash with distinctions that have
been hammered out in the underlying takings doctrines, potentially putting
pressure on those doctrines.
In Koontz itself, a non-physical regulatory alternative was offered to the
landowner in the case: preserving more of the property in an undeveloped
state under a conservation easement. Because that alternative would have
apparently allowed Koontz to make viable use of his property, and because
it would not have compromised his right to exclude as did the access
140
To be clear, consideration of the surrounding context is built into the nexus and proportionality
requirements used to assess the permissibility of a given exaction, even after it is initially flagged for heightened
scrutiny. The discussion in the text goes to antecedent question: when and how will the surrounding context be
used to decide whether heightened scrutiny applies in the first place?
141
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600.
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easements at issue in Nollan and Dolan, it seems inconceivable that it
would amount to a per se taking under existing doctrine.142 And the Court
never says that it does.143 Curiously, though, Justice Alito’s opinion implies
that every alternative offered to Koontz was a potential Nollan/Dolan
violation: the majority states that even one valid alternative would be
sufficient to save the proposed bargain from unconstitutionality.144
We think the most plausible interpretation that emerges from the
Court’s discussion is that it reframed the regulatory alternative offered to
Koontz in a way that effectively tainted it with the monetary exaction and
thereby denied it status as a stand-alone alternative.145 If this is so, then
nothing in Koontz reads directly on the status of purely in-kind regulatory
conditions (conditions, that is, that are not paired with a monetary
alternative). The question remains, however, whether the usual rules of
takings analysis—ones that examine the surrounding context to determine
whether a burden rises to the level requiring just compensation—continue
to apply after Koontz to limit the class of impositions that will trigger
heightened exactions scrutiny.
The problem the Court confronts is not limited to takings jurisprudence;
similar questions of bundling and framing run through the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine more generally.146 The Fourth Amendment challenge in
Wyman v James147 illustrates the problem well. There, receipt of welfare
benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program was conditioned on a visit to the recipient’s home. Considered on
its own, the mandatory visit would seem to be plainly unconstitutional: a
government agent cannot simply force her way into the home of a random
citizen for a friendly chat. But the Court held that the AFDC home visit
was not a search at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, much
142
But see Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz,
Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2012-13 Cato S Ct Rev 215, 236 (2013) (observing
in connection with the conservation easement condition in Koontz that “[f]orcing a property owner to allow an
easement surely would be a taking even outside the permitting process”). The easement at issue in Koontz was a
negative easement that restricted development (just as zoning codes do ubiquitously), not an affirmative easement
that granted access to the property like the ones at issue in Nollan and Dolan. While Somin is aware of this
distinction, see id. at 237, he does not appear to fully appreciate its potential significance under takings law.
143
Had it engaged in a takings analysis of the restriction on development, the Court would have needed to
proceed under Penn Central or (more implausibly) Lucas; there is no basis for claiming that such a restriction
amounts to a Loretto physical taking.
144
133 S Ct at 2598 (“We agree with respondent that, so long as a permitting authority offers the landowner
at least one alternative that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the landowner has not been subjected to an
unconstitutional condition.”).
145
In brief, because the regulatory burden could be avoided by paying money, and because paying money
was framed as a per se taking, the regulatory avoidance opportunity was seemingly framed as just another way in
which the District tried to “extort” money from the individual. See id. This interpretation is explored in Part
V.B.1.
146
See generally Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere:
The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J Legal Analysis 61 (2013); Daryl J.
Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 1311 (2002) .
147
400 US 309 (1971).
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less an unreasonable one, given the level of intrusion involved and the
governmental interest in determining eligibility for benefits.148 That is, the
Court used the very benefit for which the burden was being traded to
conclude that the burden did not implicate a constitutional right.
As this example shows, a key reason that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is so disordered is that it is never quite clear when the benefit that
is granted in exchange for ostensibly giving up a constitutional right is
relevant to the question whether one is being asked to give up a
constitutional right.149 The problem is exacerbated in the takings context not
only by the muddy and context-specific nature of the underlying takings
analysis, but also by the fact that one type of exchange—property for just
compensation—seems constitutionally unproblematic even when it is
involuntary.
4. The role of compensation.
Substantive takings law contains a unique feature: the payment of just
compensation removes the constitutional infirmity associated with an
involuntary taking for public use. Only a broken bundle—a taking for
public use without just compensation—presents a constitutional violation.150
The takings context thus differs from other contexts in which parties may be
asked to waive their constitutional rights in exchange for benefits. Where
the waiver of a right must be voluntary to be effective, it is capable of being
improperly coerced. However, there is no possibility of improperly coercing
a property owner to accept just compensation in exchange for her property
since her consent is not required at all; the government has every right to
simply compel the exchange when it does so for public use.
How should this background fact change our assessment of the
(ostensibly) voluntary interactions in which landowners and governments
engage over development rights? In a sense, we can understand the parties
to be bargaining in the shadow of eminent domain. This is not thought to
be problematic in the actual context of eminent domain: the government can
148
The Court first found that there was no search in the Fourth Amendment sense. Id at 317. The Court
went on to opine in the alternative that even if there were a search, it would be a reasonable one, given its nature
and purpose. Id at 318-24.
149
A somewhat parallel issue arose in Penn Central with respect to the treatment of Transfer Development
Rights (TDRs). In the majority’s view, the fact that the restrictions associated with historic landmark status were
accompanied by TDRs counted as a point in favor of finding those restrictions not to work a taking. 438 US 13637. The dissent argued that TDRs should enter the analysis only in order to determine whether they constituted
just compensation for the taking. Id. at 150-52 (Rehnquist dissenting).
150
Although the Takings Clause is the focus of the Court’s exactions analysis, it is possible that monetary or
regulatory impositions could implicate another constitutional right, such as the Due Process Clause. See Eduardo
Peñalver, A Few More Thoughts About Koontz, PrawsfBlawg (June 26, 2013),
online at
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/takings-and-taxes-after-koontz.html (visited Dec 5, 2013)
(observing that “there is no reason why the underlying constitutional violation has to be a taking -- it could be a
first amendment violation, a violation of the due process clause, etc.”).
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(indeed often must) first attempt a voluntary purchase before resorting to
condemnation, and if the landowner agrees to it, there is no claim that she
has been coerced to give up her right to just compensation.151
Exactions present a similar scenario: a landowner’s acceptance of an inkind regulatory benefit (development permission) in exchange for a taking
for which she could have otherwise received just compensation. The
landowner’s acceptance might suggest that the in-kind benefit was preferred
to just compensation.152 No less of a property rights proponent than Richard
Epstein has suggested that just compensation can be provided in kind as
well as in cash.153 If it is permissible for just compensation to be provided
in kind, and if an individual prefers an in-kind benefit to monetary just
compensation, hasn’t just compensation then been provided?154 Justice
Alito’s discussion of the constitutional problem with exactions in his
majority opinion in Koontz provides an emphatic negative answer:
By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s
deeding over a public right-of-way, for example, the
government can pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up
property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise
require just compensation. . . . So long as the building permit
is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could
hope to receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely to
accede to the government’s demand, no matter how
unreasonable. Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the
Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.155
This argument has implications for substantive takings law that are both
puzzling and troubling. Why would providing something that the landowner
herself deems more valuable than just compensation “frustrate the Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation”? The implicit claim must be that
the government has somehow acted wrongly in failing to provide the
desired benefit for free. But nothing in the Court’s analysis supplies the
151

See, for example, N.Y. Eminent Domain Procedure Law §303.
Perhaps some landowners are not fully informed about their rights and would not understand that just
compensation would be available for a given concession, if it were demanded in isolation. But it would be
possible to offer just compensation as an explicit alternative to the regulatory benefit in question. Douglas
Kendall and James Ryan proposed just such an approach, although they admitted some doubts about its
constitutionality. Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to
Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 Va L Rev 1801, 1803–04 (1995).
153
See Epstein, Takings at 195 (cited in note 50) (“The Constitution speaks only of ‘just’ compensation, not
of the form it must take.”); id at 195-215 (developing the idea of implicit in-kind compensation).
154
See Kendall & Ryan, 81 Va L Rev at 1843-44 (cited in note 152) (suggesting that disallowing the waiver
of monetary just compensation in favor of in-kind compensation would be inconsistent with the propertyprotection rationale underlying the just compensation requirement).
155
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594-95 (internal citations omitted).
152
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basis for this assertion.
The mystery only deepens when monetary exactions are considered.
Here, the property that is being taken is money. What just compensation
would a person be entitled to for a taking of money? Presumably, the
money back again. But if every payment made to the government in
connection with land will be evaluated in isolation and marked as a per se
taking, and if nothing other than monetary just compensation will cure this
constitutional infirmity, then the analysis spelled out in Koontz would
appear to broadly disable local governments from collecting land-related
monetary payments.156 Even if—indeed, especially if—the benefits
provided in exchange appeared much more attractive to the landowner than
the monetary payment, nothing but having the money itself back would
apparently suffice under the majority’s reading of the just compensation
requirement. The Court’s expansion of exactions doctrine thus throws into
doubt all manner of fees and assessments.
Clearly this is not what the Court had in mind. It obviously wanted to
leave intact all monetary impositions related to land except extortionate
ones. But sifting through every imposition to identify the bad ones is no
trivial exercise; it involves a significant recalibration of the relationship
between federal courts and other government actors. Courts need some
principle for defining at the outset the boundaries separating heightened
exactions scrutiny from its more traditional, deferential analysis. But, apart
from rejecting the Florida Supreme Court’s use of the distinction between
monetary and in-kind exactions, the Court in Koontz offers few clues for
identifying those boundaries.
B. Bargain-Related Limits
The distinction between ordinary land use restrictions and land use
regulatory bargains is extremely unstable, for reasons that we have already
156
The difficulty stems from two facets of the Court’s analysis. First, in counting monetary impositions as
an appropriate predicate for exactions scrutiny, the majority appears to be saying that as a matter of substantive
takings law, some subset of monetary impositions linked to identifiable land will now count as per se Loretto
takings. This on its own creates grave difficulties, ones that the majority tries to minimize by emphasizing that of
course they do not mean for this new rule to reach ordinary taxes and fees, which have never been considered
takings. The Court, however, does not offer a principled basis for its distinction between the different categories
of monetary impositions. In addition, the problem re-enters the analysis at a second point. Exactions analysis by
its very nature separates out what is demanded from what is provided in return, and applies heightened scrutiny to
interrogate the relationship between those elements. To exempt taxes and fees from this analysis means that in
some category of cases courts will not undertake this separate-and-interrogate move at all. Yet the reason can
never be, as Justice Alito’s analysis makes clear, that the implicit or explicit consent of the landowner to the
payment arrangement pulls it out of the domain of constitutional concern. Something else—something not
specified by the Court—must do so. To be sure, it is fully in alignment with unconstitutional conditions analysis
to disregard a citizen’s consent to cede her constitutional rights. See generally Hamburger, 98 Va L Rev 479
(cited in note 34). What makes applying the principle so problematic here is that (unlike in any other context) the
Court seems to be disabling landowners from consenting to pay money to the government, regardless of how
highly they value what they receive in exchange.
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discussed in Part II. The Court tiptoed around this instability in Del Monte
Dunes and Lingle. But it plowed headlong into it in Koontz. Not only did it
speak unclearly about the nature of the burden that qualifies for heightened
scrutiny, it also disavowed some potential markers relating to the nature of
qualifying bargains.
All of the Justices rejected as excessively formalistic the distinction the
Florida Supreme Court had drawn between an exaction that takes the form
of a condition precedent (denial of a permit “until condition X is satisfied”)
and one that takes the form of a condition subsequent (issuance of a permit
“subject to condition X”). Thus, “failed exactions,” as Mark Fenster has
called them,157 also receive Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. But failed exactions are
far more heterogeneous than completed exactions, as Justice Kagan’s
dissent underscores. When a permit is actually issued with a burden
attached to it, the link between the benefit proffered and the burden
demanded is clear, as is the demand itself. When a permit is denied,
however, the reasons may be opaque, multiple, or contested. The Court
does not mean to second-guess all permit denials, presumably. But how is
it possible to pick out which denials receive heightened scrutiny?
One possibility would be to examine the factual record for evidence
that the local government explicitly demanded the burden in question prior
to denying the permit, effectively linking the unmet demand to the denied
permit. But determining whether a demand has been made is itself
problematic, as Koontz illustrates. The dissent in Koontz disagreed that
there was any such demand,158 while the majority declined to address
whether the District’s “demands for property were too indefinite to give rise
to liability.”159 This ambiguity about the existence and nature of the
demand is unsurprising. The fluid and often informal nature of discussions
between landowners and land use regulators make the identification of
“demands” a difficult proposition, as our earlier discussion of Option X
emphasized. In light of Koontz, we might expect more guarded and
ambiguous conversations and less reason-giving associated with permit
denial if an explicit demand were a prerequisite to an exactions challenge.160
This will have the effect of making it even harder to determine the existence
of demands in the future.
While formalistic when considered on its own terms, the Florida
157

Fenster, 36 Vt L Rev 623 (cited in note 36).
133 S Ct at 2609-11 (Kagan dissenting).
159
Id at 2598.
160
Justice Kagan sensibly raises a concern about chilling communications between landowners and local
governments if unequivocal demands are not required. See id at 2610 (Kagan dissenting) (“If a local government
risked a lawsuit every time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would
cease to do so; indeed, the government might desist altogether from communicating with applicants.”). But if
explicit demands are required, communication is still likely to change in ways that may not improve the
administration of land use.
158
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Supreme Court’s position had the virtue of providing a clear boundary
principle for determining which demands would be subjected to the
exactions test. Given Koontz’s rejection of it, what other boundaries might
be constructed to hive off the kinds of interactions that will trigger
Nollan/Dolan analysis?
C. Taking Stock
To appreciate where Koontz leaves us, it is helpful to briefly revisit the
two dimensions along which boundaries on the scope of heightened scrutiny
might be constructed: (1) the nature of the interaction or bargain between
the government and the landowner; and (2) the nature of the concession or
burden that the government asks the landowner to accept.
Figure 4: Burdens and Bargains

As Figure 4 illustrates, burdens can be arrayed along a spectrum that
runs from general obligations (a requirement to pay or spend money) to the
taking of specific assets (e.g., taking over an access easement). 161 Bargains
can be arrayed along a spectrum from individualized (ad hoc deals) to
formulaic (e.g., tax schedules). The facts of Nollan and Dolan fall in Cell I
in this schematic; they involved exactions that would otherwise be per se
takings of land, and were carried out through an individualized
administrative or adjudicative process. The Court in Koontz expressly
161

There are other ways in which burdens might be differentiated as well. See Part V.C .
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extended the reach of heightened scrutiny into (at least) Cell II by making a
general obligation to spend or pay money, when tied to land, a qualifying
burden type.162 The Koontz majority also indicated that it did not mean to
extend heightened scrutiny fully into Cell IV, the domain of ordinary
taxes.163 But because it did not explain why, it is uncertain whether all
formulaic monetary impositions would be exempt from Nollan/Dolan
analysis. The status of Cell III—formulaic applications that burden specific
assets—also remains unclear after Koontz.164

V. A WAY FORWARD?
Koontz left the Court’s exactions and takings jurisprudence in a
confused and unsustainable state that will demand further elaboration (or
amendment) in coming Terms. What path can, will, or should the Court
take? The framework presented in Figure 4 above can help to structure the
inquiry. The Court might keep in place its existing pattern of decisions and
construct boundaries around the domain of heightened scrutiny that would
exempt all legislative enactments (Cells III and IV) or just formulaic
monetary impositions (Cell IV). Or it might draw lines along different
dimensions and split up one or more of Figure 4’s cells. More radical (and
much less likely) alternatives would involve the Court overruling past
decisions to bring all of the quadrants in Figure 4 either inside or outside the
domain of heightened scrutiny.165 The sections below explore these
possibilities.
A. The Legislative/Adjudicative Distinction
Discussed by the dissent and adopted by a number of states, one
possible distinction the Court might adopt would limit exactions scrutiny to
burdens that are imposed on a discretionary, piecemeal (i.e., adjudicative)

162
See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2598-2603. Significantly, the facts of Koontz suggest that the monetary
impositions at issue might well be categorized as falling within cell IV, and not cell II. After all, the District’s
demands were based on policies it had implemented in negotiations with other landowners seeking permission to
fill wetlands. See note 9 and accompanying text. Moreover, although the Court clearly treated the remediation
conditions set by the District as monetary in nature, the fact that they involved spending money rather than paying
it to the government could move the case closer to Figure 4’s top row.
163
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600-02.
164
An example would be a legislative enactment that dictates the dedication of a certain portion of property
for public use. See, for example, Parking Ass'n of Georgia v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), cert.
denied, 515 US 1116 (1995) (Atlanta City ordinance requiring owners of surface parking lots to set aside 10% of
the area for landscaping and provide one tree for every eight parking spaces).
165
Domains exempted from heightened exactions scrutiny would not, of course, be exempted from all
review. Rather, they would remain subject to due process and takings challenges, as well as to challenges based
on other constitutional provisions,
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basis.166 This approach would omit from heightened scrutiny any exactions
or conditions that are imposed through a broad, prospective (i.e., legislative)
enactment. The Koontz majority, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not focus on
this distinction between so-called legislative and adjudicative exactions.
Addressing the distinction was not strictly necessary to resolve the case, and
doing so would have likely made it impossible for Justice Alito to hold
together a majority.167 But a newly constituted majority (perhaps containing
some of the Koontz dissenters) might well choose the clarity and relative
boundedness of this alternative over the morass of uncertainty left behind in
Koontz. Although the distinction involves difficulties of its own (as we will
see) some sort of legislative/adjudicative distinction might keep Nollan and
Dolan from becoming the basis for completely open-ended heightened
scrutiny.
1. The distinction’s traction.
The distinction between legislative and adjudicative state action is an
appealing one for a number of reasons. First, it is well established in both
the case law and legal commentary.168 In a well-functioning democratic
system, extensive political checks attend legislative enactments, and these
arguably make it less necessary (and indeed, inappropriate) to add intrusive
judicial checks. This is the usual explanation for why legislative enactments
not burdening fundamental rights or employing suspect classifications are
afforded the most deferential standards of judicial review.169 The same
justifications for judicial deference would seem to apply in the exactions
context.170 In San Remo Hotel v San Francisco, the California Supreme
Court argued that
[a] city council that charged extortionate fees for all property
166

See 133 S Ct at 2608 (Kagan dissenting).
Justice Thomas, part of the five-justice Koontz majority, had previously suggested in a dissent from a
denial of certiorari that he viewed the legislative-adjudicative distinction as constitutionally irrelevant. See
Parking Ass'n of Georgia v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 US 1116, 1118 (1995)
(Thomas dissenting) (“The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative
takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.”).
168
See note 38 and accompanying text.
169
See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (contrasting broadly
applicable legislation, where reliance on political checks is appropriate, with case-by-case, adjudicative
decisions).
170
See, for example, McClung v City of Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir 2008) (arguing that the
concerns raised by legislative exactions are better addressed through the “ordinary restraints of the democratic
process” (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal
4th 643, 671 (2002). Although the Supreme Court expressly cited McClung’s refusal to extend exactions scrutiny
to monetary exactions with disapproval in Koontz, see 133 S Ct 2586, at 2594, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was
also grounded in its distinction between legislative and adjudicative exactions. Because the Supreme Court did
not address the adjudicative/legislative distinction in Koontz, the latter ground for the McClung holding appears to
remain intact after Koontz.
167
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development, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely
face widespread and well-financed opposition in the next
election. Ad hoc individual monetary exactions deserve
special judicial scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer
citizens and evading systematic assessment, they are more
likely to escape such political controls.171
As we have discussed, the line between broadly applicable, legislative
acts and more individualized, adjudicative land use bargains also coheres
with what seems normatively problematic about some exactions. Although
legislative acts often emerge from bargains between landowners (or
coalitions of landowners) and government actors, the result appears to be (at
least at first glance) a generally applicable law that similarly situated
landowners will be able to enjoy (or under which they would chafe) equally.
Such legislatively enacted bargains do not implicate concerns with the rule
of law to the same degree as bargains that are available only to specifically
favored (or disfavored) landowners. To return to Fuller’s criteria, exactions
promulgated through a legislative process meet the requirements of
generality, publicity, prospectivity, and congruence. And, as long as the
law is not amended too frequently, they may satisfy the requirement of
stability as well.
More pragmatically, drawing the line between legislative and
adjudicative exactions would successfully immunize taxes, broadly
applicable fees, and many aspects of zoning from heightened scrutiny.
Thus, if the distinction is judicially administrable, it could help stave off the
concern that Koontz has so expanded the exactions doctrine that every landrelated decision has become susceptible to heightened judicial scrutiny.
And it would do so in manner broadly consistent with the decided cases to
date. 172
2. Caveats and complications.
There are some problems with the legislative/adjudicative distinction,
however. Perhaps most importantly, the boundary between the categories
of legislative and adjudicative is not nearly as clear-cut in the local
government arena as it may be in other contexts.173 It is far from clear on
171

San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 671 (2002).
Arguably, it is not fully consistent with Nollan, which seemed to involve a policy of requiring lateral
easements from all beachfront owners in a particular area. See 483 U.S. at 829. However, the facts in Nollan are
susceptible to an interpretation in which the exaction in that case is individualized, notwithstanding some degree
of standardization across property owners. Certainly this is the way the case was characterized by the Court in
Lingle. See 544 US at 546 (“Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to
adjudicative land-use exactions[.]”) .
173
Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw U L Rev 1155, 1158-59 (1985).
172
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the facts of Koontz itself, for example, whether the exaction in that case was
legislative or ad hoc in character.174 The fluidity between the categories
may spark concerns about gamesmanship by local governments.
Consider the typical zoning code, which most people would treat as a
legislative enactment. In the usual Euclidean zoning law, the kind at work
in virtually every community in the United States, the municipality divides
its land up into various zones. These can vary in number, from as a few as
three or four to well over a hundred. Within each zone, certain uses are
permitted as of right, certain uses are prohibited, and others are permitted
with special approval, provided certain conditions are met.
In one sense, the zoning law operates through generally applicable
provisions: all those who fall within the same zoning category are subject
to the same regulations. But the higher the number of zones, the more that
uniformity claim breaks down. (Imagine a city with a different zoning
classification for each parcel.) And, of course, along the boundaries
between zones, the lawmaker has to make highly individualized judgment
calls about which individual parcels to include within which classification
in a way that puts enormous pressure on the distinction between legislation
and adjudication.
Even setting aside the problem of placing parcels into one or another of
the possible zoning classifications, bargaining and discretion are built into
most zoning and land use laws. Consider the three categories of bargains
we introduced above in Part II:
Past Bargains. The complexity of zoning laws makes them almost
infinitely customizable. During a comprehensive rewriting of a zoning law,
property owners can lobby lawmakers to place their parcel in one zone or
another. They can also lobby lawmakers to include some borderline use in
the category in which their land is ultimately placed. A landowner may lose
the fight to have her property designated as commercial but convince
zoning officials to include convenience stores as a conditional use in a high
density residential zone. Neighbors may insist that convenience stores in
residential neighborhoods operate under strict limits on size and business
hours. The negotiations can go on and on. In the end, they will be
memorialized in generally applicable packages of benefits and burdens.
Despite the messiness and complexity of zoning code writing, it
arguably still makes sense to place these past bargains in the legislative box.
After all, the bargains built into the code are in some sense prospectively
available to all similarly situated landowners. The mere fact that a
particular zoning provision might have been crafted through a process of
individualized horse-trading is not so different from the way legislation is
174

See note 162.

48

Fennell & Peñalver

[7-Dec-13

written in other areas. Rather than fixating on the fact of past horse-trading,
a concern with the rule of law would seem to argue in favor of considering
the substance of zoning provisions on their own terms. That is, instead of
asking whether a zoning provision is based on past bargaining, the question
would be whether the lines it draws are unfair or arbitrary or leave
excessive room for administrative discretion. These are questions that
courts have typically (at least in recent years) answered by applying the
most deferential standards of review.175
Embedded Bargains. Embedded bargains are pervasive in zoning codes.
As long as the conditions they impose are defined with sufficient precision,
these need not present too much of a problem for the
legislative/adjudicative distinction. Like past bargains embedded in
existing law, formulaic tradeoffs that are available on equal terms to all
similarly situated landowners do not present the favoritism and rule of law
concerns that seem to be the most plausible justifications for heightened
exactions scrutiny.
Some embedded bargains, however, include conditions that place a
great deal of discretion in the hands of land use regulators. The zoning code
for the City of Puyallup, Washington, for example, is typical in specifying
that, in considering an application for any conditional use, “[t]he hearing
examiner shall have the authority to impose conditions and safeguards as
he/she deems necessary to protect and enhance the health, safety and
welfare of the surrounding area.”176 Although formally embodied in a
legislative work product, such a scheme clearly contemplates case by case,
ad hoc judgments.177
In contrast, incentive zoning normally operates through schedules of the
burdens the developer must undertake in exchange for the specified
regulatory relief. The available regulatory benefits – and their “price” – are
typically spelled out in advance in a great deal of detail and publicly
available to all prospective developers on equal terms. For example, under
Seattle’s incentive zoning scheme, developers can exceed height restrictions
175
See, for example, Hernandez v City of Hanford, 159 P3d 33 (Cal 2007) (applying rational basis review in
assessing an equal protection challenge to a zoning provision that prohibited stand-alone furniture stores outside
of the downtown commercial district while allowing the sale of furniture in large department stores in those
areas).
176
Puyallup Municipal Code, 20.80.015.
177
Interestingly, the code goes on to say that “[n]o conditional use permit shall require as a condition the
dedication of land for any purpose not reasonably related to the use of property for which the conditional use
permit is requested, nor posting of a bond to guarantee installation of public improvements not reasonably related
to the use of property for which the conditional use permit is requested.” Id. In effect, it incorporates a modified
exactions analysis into the code itself in an attempt to structure the discretion of decisionmakers in tacking
customized conditions onto embedded bargains. In so doing, it seems to invite a kind of means-ends scrutiny by a
court tasked with evaluating the legality (under the municipal code) of a particular condition that a hearing
examiner attaches to a conditional use permit. This approach is consistent with the idea that the need for robust
review increases as discretion grows.
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by a specified amount if their building is LEED certified and they pay a
certain amount of money per additional square foot into an affordable
housing fund.178
Where embedded bargains put broad discretion in the hands of
regulators, and where regulators use that discretion to impose one-off
exactions on landowners on a case-by-case basis, the mere fact that they do
so pursuant to the language of a zoning code would not justify treating their
impositions as “legislative.” Particularly in the state courts, judges have
shown a willingness to scrutinize legislative enactments that place unbridled
discretion in the hands of land-use administrators.179 But where the
embedded bargains employ publicly available terms that are spelled out in
detail and broadly available – as in incentive zoning – the scheme is far
more legislative in nature and the case for judicial scrutiny is significantly
weaker.
Hypothetical Bargains. Finally, hypothetical bargains reflect the reality
that land use decisionmaking often occurs through piecemeal modification
of the zoning law. Even inchoate or unsuccessful efforts by landowners to
revise the mix of burdens and benefits embodied in an existing zoning code
present the same opportunities for favoritism and corruption that are present
in the classic exactions cases. To be sure, if the negotiations break down
because of a landowner’s objection to burdens the municipality proposes to
write into the modified zoning law itself (burdens that would therefore be
generally applicable to all similarly situated landowners), the
adjudicative/legislative distinction would counsel against treating the
hypothetical bargain as an exaction that calls for heightened scrutiny. But
where a local government declines to modify the zoning code because of an
owner’s refusal to accede to the municipality’s demands that the owner
accept some customized burden, the refusal to rezone looks structurally
identical to the exaction at issue in Koontz. Heightened exactions scrutiny
for individualized hypothetical deals would operate almost like a penalty on
(attempted) contract zoning.
Not all states treat piecemeal zoning modifications as legitimate
legislative acts. Some, such as Maryland, apply a kind of heightened
scrutiny to such changes under the so-called “change-mistake” doctrine.
Piecemeal zoning changes, as opposed to comprehensive rezonings, must be
justified as necessary to either fix a mistake in the original code or to
178
See Seattle Planning Commission, Incentive Zoning in Seattle, 3 (2007), online at
http://www.seattle.gov/planningcommission/docs/SPC_IncZon.pdf (visited Nov. 20, 2013).
179
See, for example, Anderson v City of Issaquah, 851 P2d 744 (Wash App 1993) (finding a municipal
regulation of aesthetic standards to be void for vagueness); Kosalka v Town of Georgetown, 752 A2d 183, 187
(Maine 2000) (holding that a regulation that is “totally lacking in cognizable, quantitative standards . . . violate[s]
the due process clause.”).
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respond to some change in circumstances since the code was
comprehensively (re)written. 180 Applying heightened exactions scrutiny to
some failed negotiations over zoning amendments would seem to push
municipalities in the direction of states like Maryland. Indeed, in states
where piecemeal rezoning is discouraged by doctrines like the changemistake rule, the category of hypothetical bargains may largely disappear.
B. Everything But Taxes and Fees
There is another way that the Court could keep its commitment to
elevated scrutiny for most exactions without endangering taxes and fees. It
could construct a test that effectively immunizes from heightened scrutiny
only those conditional burdens that fall within Cell IV of Figure 4: ones that
use a formulaic schedule to impose purely monetary burdens on
landowners. To trigger heightened scrutiny, then, a landowner could show
either that the government was engaging in an individualized deal with her
(involving any sort of concession) or that it was requiring some in-kind
concession (whether through a legislative or adjudicative process).
Such an approach would not exempt the sorts of Cell III legislative
enactments at issue in Parking Association of Georgia v. City of
Atlanta181—a city ordinance that required surface parking lot owners to
provide a specified quantum of landscaping.182 It would, however, exempt
property taxes, standardized permitting fees, and so on. This would help to
address some of the concerns that the Koontz decision introduced. But what
should remain problematic from the Court’s perspective is the extension of
scrutiny into the Cell III box. Virtually all of zoning law resides there (to
the extent it is not captured in Cell I). Heightened scrutiny applied to
everything but taxes would upend the generally deferential treatment that
land use controls receive, unless it were coupled with some other boundary
principle. The Court resisted such an open-ended extension of heightened
scrutiny in Del Monte Dunes.183
Expanding heightened scrutiny to reach in-kind regulatory burdens that
are legislatively applied would also have the interesting consequence of
encouraging price schedules to stand in for contextualized, qualitative
evaluations and in-kind adjustments. Thus, if a side-yard requirement would
receive heightened scrutiny under this approach (because it conditions
See Clayman v Prince George’s County, 292 A2d 689 (Md 1972).
450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), cert. denied, 515 US 1116 (1995).
182
It is possible, however, that such burdens might be deemed insufficient to trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis
for another reason: that they do not amount to takings on their own. While it is true that the ordinance in Parking
Association of Georgia required physically placing one tree for every eight parking spaces, it would seem that
landscaping requirements, including the placement of privately owned trees, would be no different from the
requirement of a smoke alarm that the Loretto Court suggested would not be a taking.
183
526 US 687, 702 (1999).
180
181
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permission to build on leaving an area unbuilt, albeit legislatively), a local
government could instead put a price on the right to build closer to the lot
line. This could effectively make zoning more alienable by replacing
property rules with liability rules—a result many law and economics
scholars would find attractive, but that others might view with concern.184
By extending heightened scrutiny so deeply into the heartland of land use,
the Court could prompt changes—perhaps unintended ones—in the way
that land use control is carried out.
C. Other Limits
The Court need not approach each of our Cells in Figure 4 as an all-ornothing proposition, of course. There are any number of ways that the
spectrums of concessions and interactions could be divided up, and features
other than the ones emphasized in the figure—between specific assets and
general obligations, and between individualized and particularized bargains
—could play a role in marking out the exactions that would trigger
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.
1. Burden sifting.
We have already suggested one way of identifying those concessions
that will trigger heightened scrutiny: the existence of a burden that would
constitute a taking on its own. It is unclear how the Court will ultimately
square its claim in Koontz that some general monetary obligations are
Loretto takings with the rest of takings jurisprudence. However, it is
possible that some category of regulatory actions and financial obligations
will be safeguarded against heightened scrutiny on the grounds that they
would not constitute takings on their own. Although the Court seems to
have doomed itself (and lower courts) to struggle with which land-related
financial obligations will now constitute Loretto takings, it is still possible
for it to apply this principle of a “taking on its own” to exempt from
heightened scrutiny regulatory exactions that do not rise to the level of
permanent physical occupations.
Setbacks, landscaping requirements, and all manner of ordinary zoning
tools (such as conditional use permitting requirements) could be kept clear
of the Nollan/Dolan framework through this expedient alone, even without
drawing a distinction between legislative and adjudicative acts. This
restriction on eligible burdens could also be combined with the exemption
184

For an argument in support of the extensive use of development taxes instead of land use regulation, see
Stewart E. Sterk, Exploring Taxation as a Substitute for Overregulation in the Development Process, 78 Brooklyn
L Rev 417 (2013).
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of formulaic monetary impositions (the Cell IV cases). In combination,
these approaches would salvage most of what the Court likely wishes to
protect from heightened scrutiny, while allowing it to keep Nollan, Dolan,
and Koontz in place.
There are other possible ways to slice and dice the universe of
concessions. Requirements to spend money could be distinguished from
payments directly to the government.185 Expenditures to bring one’s own
property into compliance with particular requirements could be
distinguished from offsite expenditures. Concessions that reduce the value
of one’s property without benefiting identifiable people directly (such as by
placing certain areas under a conservation easement) could be distinguished
from concessions that are undertaken for the benefit of specific neighbors or
third parties. All such alternatives must be assessed with an eye to the
impact on administrability, the collateral effects on takings doctrine more
generally, and the degree of fit with whatever normative goals are supposed
to be served by heightening scrutiny.
2. Multiple-choice tests.
The practical reach of exactions scrutiny could also be limited through
the treatment of multiple-option governmental offers. Koontz itself
involved a landowner who could develop his parcel if he did enough to
mitigate the effects on the wetlands. The District gave him at least two
choices that it considered sufficient: cutting back the amount of developed
land to one acre (that is, placing a larger amount under a conservation
easement than he had initially contemplated), or providing funds necessary
to carry out wetlands mitigation on another parcel. The Court found this to
be a potentially extortionate choice set. Although Justice Alito suggested
that the exaction would pass muster if even one of the alternatives were
acceptable, this is not how his analysis played out. Because the monetary
exaction was offered as an alternative to giving up the use of a greater
proportion of the parcel, the majority opinion framed the monetary
imposition as a charge for getting to use more of the parcel, which in its
view collapsed the District’s multiple choice offering to a single
extortionate demand.
In fact, the Court appears to be saying that, if money is offered as an
alternative way to fulfill the landowner’s obligation, all other choices will
be viewed as tainted. The constitutional hook would be that the demand for
money, if viewed in isolation, counts as a per se taking (although this had
never been the law before Koontz). If so, the monetary choice might seem to
185
See Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause (working paper 2013) online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298307 (visited Dec 5, 2013).
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dangle before the landowner the possibility of reducing regulatory burdens
(including the burdens of the other available alternatives offered to the
landowner) by giving up the right to just compensation for what in the
Koontz majority’s view amounts to a per se taking (i.e., the money itself).
As actually carried out in Koontz, then, the addition of alternatives does
nothing to avoid heightened scrutiny—as long as one of the choices is
monetary in nature. On the contrary, adding a monetary choice seemingly
subjects the entire enterprise to Nollan/Dolan analysis.
There are other ways the analysis could proceed, however. If Justice
Alito had taken seriously his point about any valid alternative validating the
exaction, then the ability of Koontz to glean viable economic use from his
property without being required to cede anything that remotely resembled a
per se taking should have been sufficient to keep the negotiation out of the
realm of Nollan and Dolan scrutiny. Yet it is easy enough to see why the
Koontz majority proceeded as it did. The alternative that allowed
development of a portion of the property without ceding anything that
would count as a taking on its own simply became, in the Court’s mind, part
of the baseline against which a new bargain—this one involving money—
was offered. And the same will always be true whenever money is allowed
to stand in for other regulatory alternatives—even one that is presented as
another conditional option.
But what if the governmental entity does not offer a monetary
alternative at all, and also does not propose a physical taking? Suppose, to
take the facts of Koontz, that the owner were simply told that he could
develop one acre of his land if he placed another portion of the parcel under
a conservation easement, or downzoned it to a less intensive development
classification. Does this constrained choice set avoid triggering heightened
scrutiny? Seemingly yes, at least if the Koontz majority meant to retain the
“taking on its own” requirement. What is being asked in exchange for
development rights is the sort of concession that would not count as a taking
under Loretto, nor under Lucas or Penn Central. This analysis suggests that
by removing options, heightened scrutiny may be dodged, and by adding
them, it may be triggered. Such a result might not seem surprising in the
context of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. After all, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is puzzling precisely because it frowns on
governments adding, rather than removing, choices.
Is there a way to structure a menu of choices so that it reduces rather
than exacerbates the normative concerns behind exactions? One possibility
might involve offering landowners a choice between a fee generated by a
formula or schedule and an individualized in-kind regulatory concession.
The presence of the former, offered as a take-it-or-leave-it offer available on
equal terms to all, could address worries about the rule of law and
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horizontal inequity, while the latter might allow mutually beneficial
adjustments to be made from that baseline.
An obvious objection would be that the monetary schedule might be set
artificially high, so that no one would elect it. All the real action would
then occur within the individualized regulatory deals. But if this were so,
then the monetary schedule would not actually serve the sort of illegitimate
leveraging purpose that troubled the Koontz Court. An option that no one
actually chooses (and cannot be forced to choose) cannot plausibly
constitute a form of extortion. It is true, however, that less powerful
developers might find themselves limited to the monetary schedule, while
the government offered favored developers lighter regulatory alternatives.
Some of the regulatory alternatives offered by the government might also be
problematically burdensome in their own right, even if they were
insufficient to amount to takings on their own. The existence of a fixed
menu of choices does not by itself ensure perfect equity or safeguard ruleof-law values. But it would be possible to reinterpret the significance of
multiple alternatives in a manner that is more conducive to the efforts of
local governments to arrive at alternatives that offset development impacts
in the least costly manner.
D. Scrutiny All Around
The impetus for our effort to craft a boundary principle for
Nollan/Dolan analysis has been the need to maintain the two fixed points
created by past takings cases: deferential review of most land use
regulations and the carve-out of heightened judicial scrutiny for certain
“exactions.” If, however, we were liberated from these two fixed points, the
pressure to precisely define the domain of exactions scrutiny would
diminish. In that situation, what direction should the law take? It is worth
thinking about two very different scenarios. In the first, taken up in this
section, courts would jettison the longstanding deference afforded to land
use regulation since Euclid. Instead of deferring, courts would employ
something like heightened exactions scrutiny to all land use regulations.
This would be a kind of Lochnerism, but one reserved for the context of
land use law. In the second, taken up in section E, courts would broaden
the domain of Euclid deference to exactions, abandoning the island of
heightened scrutiny it has created under Nollan and Dolan.
It would certainly be (conceptually) possible to subject all or most land
use controls to heightened scrutiny. The disadvantages of this approach are
obvious. Although many land use regulations would withstand judicial
scrutiny, the costs of adjudicating the legitimacy of those regulations would
be enormous. Small local governments are particularly poorly situated to
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bear those costs. Rather than risk being hauled into court, local
governments are more likely to simply scale back their regulation. This
might superficially seem like a desirable outcome for a certain brand of
naive libertarianism. But it would have the perverse effect of depriving
local governments of their principal tools for protecting landowners against
threats to the use and enjoyment of their property. Oregon’s unhappy
experience with Measure 37 suggests that, once they confront the
unpredictability of unregulated land use, owners quickly come to realize the
protective value of at least some land use regulation.186
On the other hand, enhanced judicial scrutiny of land use regulation
would have some silver linings. Although zoning is a crucial tool for
protecting owners from the unpredictability of neighboring land uses, it is
also a vehicle by which local governments give the force of law to those
owners’ prejudices and narrow self-interest. From its inception, the story of
zoning has been as much about exclusion, free-riding, and sprawl as it has
been about the thoughtful coordination of conflicting land uses. Key among
the benefits of extending the domain of heightened judicial scrutiny in the
domain of land use regulation would be its ability to lay bare the thin
justifications for many types of zoning restrictions.
While it is interesting to consider the implications of such a move, we
view it as too unlikely to carry the day and too disruptive of settled
expectations to warrant its full explication here. Nor is it likely to be, all
things considered, the most attractive or useful tack for addressing problems
like exclusionary zoning. Nonetheless, it is helpful to bear in mind the
nature of the constraint the Court faces as it seeks to avoid this outcome.
E. Relocate Exactions
An alternative to extending the reach of heightened exactions scrutiny
would be to give up on the exactions project, at least as understood as part
of takings jurisprudence. It would be possible to revert to rational basis style
means-ends review for all land use controls, including those that are
packaged into bargains or that involve concessions that would otherwise be
takings. This suggestion is less radical than it appears. The Supreme
Court’s exactions cases are of relatively recent vintage. And reverting to
deferential review as a matter of federal constitutional law would not mean
abandoning all checks on governmental power. Takings under Penn
Central, Lucas, and Loretto would provide a continuing avenue for
landowners seeking relief from the most onerous regulatory burdens. In
addition, landowners would be able to seek judicial review of arbitrary and
irrational regulation through the Due Process Clause. Further, any of a
186

See Berger, 78 Fordham L Rev 1281 (cited in note 139).
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number of special-purpose state-law doctrines constrain bargaining in
various ways to protect landowners and third parties. We will discuss these
last two options in turn.
1. The Due Process Clause.
Courts can already review local land use bargains for basic fairness and
rationality using the tools of substantive due process, and they could
continue to do so in the absence of any federal exactions doctrine located
within the Takings Clause. Relying on due process review to police
improper bargains would fit better with the Court’s prior pronouncements
about the division of labor between the Takings Clause and the Due Process
Clause.187 As the Court made clear in Lingle, the Takings Clause is focused
on protecting owners from bearing excessive burdens. Scrutiny of the fit
between the public ends served by a land use regulation and the means
chosen is not a takings question, but one of substantive due process.
This distinction between due process questions and takings questions is
not an empty formalism. The remedy for a violation of the Takings Clause
is payment of just compensation. The remedy for a violation of due process
is invalidation of the government action. This is because the wrong
associated with the Takings Clause is simply the failure to structure a
legitimate government action in a way that avoids putting an excessive
burden on a particular property owner. This wrong is fixed by the payment
of compensation. The wrong associated with a violation of substantive due
process is more grave: a failure of the government to act according to basic
rationality or to act in pursuit of legitimate ends. 188 And so the remedy is to
block the government action in a more categorical way.
The rule-of-law harms that exactions doctrine seems designed to capture
—favoritism and corruption—are much closer in their nature and
seriousness to the harms encompassed by the Due Process Clause than they
are to those that form the subject of protection against uncompensated
takings. In recent years, Justice Kennedy has championed a more vigorous
use of rational basis due process review to address problems ranging from

187
Many of the claims we find amenable to due process scrutiny could just as easily be evaluated under an
equal protection analysis. As we have already discussed, see text accompanying notes 90-93, the means-end
inquiry at work in the substantive due process context closely resembles similar inquiries courts have used in both
the due process and public use contexts. That similarity is likely generated by a common normative foundation in
rule of law concerns about the dangers of arbitrary government action. And the fundamental exactions complaint
in its most attractive form – that the government has treated the landowner arbitrarily – is largely the same under
both theories. For an examination of how equal protection analysis might even address concerns that are currently
treated as regulatory takings issues, see generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102
Nw U L Rev 1 (2008).
188
See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 97 Cornell L Rev 305,
323-24 (2012).
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“judicial takings”189 to general obligations to pay money.190 He has
connected due process concerns to the public use requirement within
takings law.191 Consistent with this approach, the Court should consider
extending meaningful due process review into the domain of the kinds of
adjudicative land-use bargains we have been discussing. Grounding this
inquiry in due process would eliminate the need for an anomalously
heightened-means-ends exactions review within the takings doctrine. At
the same time, focusing it narrowly on the category of bargains most likely
to provide opportunities for government favoritism and abuse would limit
the danger of an ever-expanding domain of heightened judicial scrutiny in
the land use context.
We do not mean to suggest that moving the exactions inquiry into the
due process arena will automatically resolve all difficulties. Appropriate
doctrines must be crafted or adapted to achieve rule-of-law ends. Our
discussion has suggested that this undertaking will involve difficult
tradeoffs between flexibility and stability, uniformity and customization.
Whatever tests are crafted—and we do not undertake to specify them
here—will be imperfect and subject to criticism. But they should at least
be addressed to the right sort of inquiry. What makes grounding exactions
doctrine in the Takings Clause so problematic is that it requires
piggybacking on a set of substantive doctrines that are asking an entirely
different question (whether burdens should be borne without compensation)
than the one to which exactions concerns are most plausibly addressed (has
the government abused its power). Moving exactions doctrine into the Due
Process Clause would produce conceptual congruence between the doctrinal
foundation and the concerns that exactions generate. It would free the Court
from the futile and destructive task of attempting to shoehorn its concerns
about government misbehavior into categories created to address
compensable (but otherwise proper) governmental burdens. And it would
reduce the risk that such shoehorning will (in the process) distort both
exactions and takings doctrine.
2. State law.
Apart from federal due process review, it is important to remember that
state courts have developed a number of state-law doctrines to address the
issues raised by bargaining and discretion in the land use context. These

189
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S Ct 2592, 2614 (2010) (Kennedy
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
190
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 US 498, 446-50 (1998) (Kennedy concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
191
Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy concurring).
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include (1) restrictions on contract and spot zoning;192 (2) state law
exactions doctrines;193 (3) limitations on the ability to engage in piecemeal
rezonings, such as the change-mistake rule;194 and (4) standards of due
process review that exceed those imposed by federal constitutional
norms.195 All of these doctrines work either to constrain the sort of
discretion necessary to get land-use bargains off the ground or to police
those bargains once they are made.
An advantage of relying on state law is broader state court exposure to
land use conflicts and more permissive standing doctrines in state courts
that would permit a (potentially) all-encompassing approach to bargains.
“Exactions” as a problem of federal constitutional law seems concerned
only with landowners being exploited, and that is the pattern that exactions
claims have invariably taken: a landowner challenges the conditions
imposed on her in exchange for development approval. But land-use
bargains raise important questions of fairness to third parties not included in
the negotiations. Neighbors may have cause to challenge land use bargains
that exact too little from developers in exchange for permission to develop
land in ways that harm others. Having a layer of federal protection that
applies only to a subset of the overall issue of improper bargains arguably
impedes coherent state law solutions.
Another advantage to leaving (more) exactions review to the states is
that state courts are well equipped to tailor solutions to the ways in which
deals are typically accomplished in the particular jurisdiction. Because
most land use law is state law, state courts are far more familiar with the
dynamics of land use regulation in their jurisdictions than federal courts can
realistically hope to become.196 One concern of the Koontz dissent is that—
if heightened review extends too broadly—communications between
landowners and government will be inhibited. This is not necessarily a bad
thing, if we examine some of the strategic implications of placing one party
192
See Little v Winborn, 518 NW2d 384, 387-89 (Iowa 1994) (scrutinizing spot zoning); Dacy v Village of
Ruidoso, 845 P2d 793, 796-98 (NM 1992) (discussing judicial scrutiny of contract zoning).
193
See Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 389-91 (1994) (surveying state-law exactions doctrines). Some
state law limits on development conditions do not expressly use the term “exaction” or may find doctrinal footing
outside the Takings Clause. See, for example, Rosen v Village of Downers Grove, 167 NE2d 230 (Ill 1960).
194
See note 180 and accompanying text.
195
See, for example, Johnson v City of Peducah, 512 SW2d 514 (Ky 1974) (striking down a local land use
ordinance as violating Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution, which prohibits “arbitrary” state action).
196
See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalism Dimension of Takings Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L J 203, 226-28
(2004) (discussing the difficulty that federal courts have in assessing land use laws for constitutional validity and
arguing that state courts are better situated to undertake that role); Rick Hills, Bill Fischel on Koontz: Why
Federalism Should Limit Enforcement of the Takings Doctrine, Prawfsblawg, Aug. 16, 2013, 12:50 pm,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/08/bill-fischel-on-koontz-why-federalism-should-limitenforcement-of-takings-doctrine.html (making a case for using state law as the primary mechanism for policing
exactions and quoting Fischel for the point that a more localized perspective dominates “the view from
Olympus.”). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 Tulsa L Rev
751, 762 (2009) (maintaining that “state courts, not federal courts, should be centrally responsible for limiting
eminent domain abuses by state and local agencies”).
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or the other into the position of making a take it or leave it offer. 197
Changing the way lines of communication work can be useful, but there is
no reason to think that federal courts are best able to fine-tune these
changes. Even if there is some best way to reduce leverage, experimentation
at the state level seems more likely to arrive at it than occasional Supreme
Court pronouncements.
CONCLUSION
In Nollan and Dolan, the Court started down a path that, if followed
beyond a certain point, cannot be reconciled with broad judicial deference
to garden-variety land use controls. When a particular fact pattern is placed
in the Nollan/Dolan box, it receives astonishing treatment: the government
must prove that the burdens it has imposed are logically related to and
proportionate to the costs of the permitted development. Applying this
approach to all of land use would mean that zoning and much else would
either disappear or become prohibitively expensive to administer. This
presumably would be unacceptable to the Court and to most property
owners. Yet Koontz heedlessly lurched toward this unwanted endpoint,
knocking over barriers that it found logically unconvincing, unaccountably
confident that its exactions jurisprudence would obviously and
automatically spare all “good” land use regulations.
The result is a doctrinally disordered decision. It is entirely possible,
perhaps even likely, that some of the worst on-the-ground impacts will be
significantly buffered. For example, Rick Hills has suggested that the
Koontz Court’s failure to specify damages offers courts a viable “exit
strategy.”198 Anemic remedies or procedural blockades may keep many of
the problems foreseen by the dissent from coming about, or from taking
their most catastrophic forms. Repeat-play developers may acquiesce with
local governments in legally questionable but mutually beneficial deals.199
In this sense, Koontz may turn out to be much ado about nothing. But in
another sense, Koontz embodies a tension that the Court cannot ultimately
197

See, for example, Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027, 1049-50 (1995) (discussing the bargaining advantages associated with take-itor-leave-it offers).
198
See Rick Hills, Koontz's Unintelligible Takings Rule: Can Remedial Equivocation Save the Court from a
Doctrinal
Quagmire?,
Prawfsblawg,
June
25,
2013,
3:41
pm,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzs-unintelligible-takings-rule-can-remedialequivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherent-substantive-.html (“Koontz carefully preserves a convenient albeit
disingenuous ‘remedial’ exit strategy that should insure that the decision is a dead letter.”). Hills focuses on the
following line from the majority opinion: “Because petitioner brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of
action, the Court has no occasion to discuss what remedies might be available for a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional
conditions violation either here or in other cases.” Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2597 (quoted in Hills).
199
See Dana, 75 NC L Rev 1286-99 (cited in note 37). Doctrines of standing play a role here, including
whether (and on what grounds) third parties such as neighbors are allowed to challenge deals that affect their
interests. See note 75.
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avoid addressing—one over the best way to reconcile fundamentally
inconsistent strands of property rights protection. We hope that by
conveying something of this tension here, we have added to an
understanding of the contradictory dictates of property protection itself—
whether or not the Court manages to address them in a satisfying way.
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